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ABSTRACT 
Creating high quality software is a primary concern for software development 
organizations. Researchers have devoted considerable effort in developing quality improvement 
methods that help software engineers detect faults early in the development lifecycle (when the 
faults are cheapest to detect and repair). While useful, the available approaches still cannot make 
sure that Software developers are able to identify all or even a significantly large portion of 
faults. This is because they do not help software developers identify errors (i.e., underlying cause 
of faults) that may have led to the insertion of the faults (i.e., manifestation of error). This lack of 
focus on errors causes some faults to be overlooked which impacts quality of software produced. 
Requirements engineering is the most people-intensive phase of software development. 
Thus, requirements engineering is more prone to human error when compared to other phases of 
software development. To that end, this dissertation focuses on understanding the human error 
causes of requirements faults. The central idea that drives this dissertation is that, knowledge of 
errors that commonly occur during the requirements engineering process can help software 
developers in detecting faults that are otherwise overlooked when using traditional approaches 
and also help them to avoid making errors when developing requirements.   
Human error research focuses on understanding and classifying the fallibilities of human 
cognition. This dissertation combines requirements error information (gathered from Software 
Engineering literature) with the general accounts of human error and human error models 
(gathered from the Psychology literature). There are three steps to this work: 
• Development of a requirements phase human error taxonomy, 
• Empirical validation of the taxonomy’s usefulness for understanding requirements 
faults and errors, and 
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• Development and subsequent validation of a formal software inspection technique 
based on the taxonomy. 
As a result of this dissertation, a structured Human Error Taxonomy (HET) that classifies 
requirements phase errors was created with direct ties to the existing human error theories. 
Several empirical validations of the taxonomy have helped in: 
• Successfully demonstrating the taxonomy’s usefulness for understanding 
requirements faults and errors, and 
• Developing a formal HET-based Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach 
and supplementary human error investigation tools. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Software development is an extremely human-centric activity that involves participation 
of several people who perform various developmental tasks. During the early phase of software 
development, software developers elicit user needs, translate those needs into requirements, and 
validate the requirements for correctness, completeness, and other quality attributes. Owing to 
the involvement of various stakeholders (both technical and non-technical) in this process, there 
is the potential for human errors (i.e., human cognitive failures) to occur.  
Cognitive Psychologists have long studied and analyzed the types of errors that people 
commit when performing different types of tasks in safety-critical, human-centric domains such 
as aviation, medicine, railway system, and nuclear power plants [1–4]. This research has not only 
improved the human performance in these domains, but has also lead to a decrease in 
unfavorable incidents by helping organizations identify and prevent errors. Because software 
development is a complex, human-centric activity, the fallibility of human cognition (during 
activities such as user-need elicitation, requirements and design analysis) leads to human errors. 
These human errors can then lead to various types of faults. In the same manner that human error 
research has benefited other domains by providing error identification/prevention mechanisms, 
this dissertation hypothesizes that properly applied human error research can have similar 
quality-improvement effects in software development. To that end, in this dissertation, I have 
applied the Cognitive Psychology research on human errors to propose a human error-based 
approach for improving software quality.  
1.1. Historical Perspective on Software Quality Improvement 
Software quality (or lack thereof), is a primary concern for both software developers and 
researchers. Much research and experience has shown that identifying and correcting problems 
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during the earlier phases of software development (i.e., requirements phase) can save significant 
project costs (associated with rework) [5–7]. Research has shown that about 40% of total project 
budget is spent on rework [5, 8], and furthermore, finding and fixing requirements faults 
consumes between 70% to 85% of the total project rework cost [9, 10]. To alleviate these 
requirements quality problems, researchers have proposed and empirically validated the 
usefulness of a variety of requirements quality improvement techniques ranging from fault-
checklist based artifact reviews [11–14] to N-Fold inspections [15–17]to Perspective Based 
Reading [18–20]. The fault-checklist technique, which is the most popular requirements 
inspection method, uses the “lessons learned” from historical fault data to suggest ways for 
reviewers to identity faults [21, 22]. N-Fold inspections improves the fault-checklist technique 
by replicating the inspection activities using N independent inspection teams. Perspective Based 
Reading (PBR) technique focusses on examining requirements artifacts from different 
perspectives of the potential users of the artifact [18]. PBR tries to improve inspection efficiency 
by minimizing the overlap among the faults detected by the inspectors. Although successful in 
improving requirements quality, research has shown that even the most faithful application of 
inspection approaches like fault-checklist, N-fold inspections, and PBR can help locate only 50-
60% of the faults present in requirements documents [13, 21].    
As can be seen from the discussion above,  even though the above-mentioned techniques 
(like PBR) have achieved varying degrees of success, they cannot help software development 
teams find and fix all requirements problems because they treat the symptoms of the problem 
(i.e., faults) and not the underlying causes of the problem (i.e., human error) [22, 23]. Identifying 
these human errors can help Software engineers understand why problems occurred, find and fix 
related faults, and prevent errors and faults from happening in the future. To that end, this 
 3 
dissertation hypothesizes that focusing on human errors (i.e., the underlying causes of faults) as 
compared to focusing on faults alone can help software development teams find all or most of 
the faults, and hence provide a more complete and sound method to address the software quality 
problem. 
1.2. Dissertation Goals 
Human error research has been successfully adapted in various domains like aviation, 
medicine, and process control [4, 24–28] for improving both the process quality and the product 
quality. Human error research relies on studying human information processing models to 
investigate mental processes that lead to cognitive failures. These cognitive failures are also 
referred to as human errors or mental errors.  
Faults/defects in software engineering artifacts arise during the process of translating (or 
processing) information gathered from the users into requirements, design, and then code. Each 
of these activities are human-centric and are prone to human cognitive failures (or human errors). 
This dissertation tries to apply human error research to improve the quality of software artifacts. 
In order to have the greatest impact on software quality, this research focusses on the very first 
phase of software development - the requirements phase - wherein customer needs are gathered 
from different stakeholders and translated into a formal specification. This formal specification is 
referred to as the SRS (Software Requirements Specification). The SRS is generally written in 
Natural Language (NL) and acts as a means of communication among stakeholders. The 
requirements development process (which produces the SRS) is especially prone to human errors 
(and consequently defects) due to the following reasons: (1) The requirements phase is very 
fuzzy due to the involvement of a number of technical and non-technical stakeholders like end-
users, analysts, and programmers, and (2) Natural language is inherently vague and ambiguous.   
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As mentioned earlier (in Section 1.1), fault-based defect detection techniques are not able 
to find all the defects in the requirements artifacts [23], [29]. The major gap left by these fault-
based techniques is a missing mapping between a fault (manifestation of a human error) and the 
underlying source of the fault (i.e., the human error). Therefore, the current dissertation 
investigates where and how the failures of human cognition (i.e., human errors) occur during the 
requirements development process. To that end, the primary goal of this dissertation is defined as 
follows: 
To identify and analyze the types of human errors that occur during the requirements 
phase and to develop a structured human error taxonomy to help the requirements 
engineers in understanding the identified human errors.   
Another goal of this dissertation is to develop techniques and tools that utilize human 
error information for the purpose of defect detection in requirements artifacts (SRS). With 
regards to defect detection, the primary focus of this dissertation is on developing a requirements 
inspection technique and its supplemental tools. The two primary goals of this dissertation are 
reiterated in Table 1. 
Table 1. Primary Goals of Dissertation 
# Goal 
1 Identify and analyze the types of human errors that occur during the requirements 
phase and develop an intuitive human error framework to help the requirements 
engineers in understanding the identified human errors.   
2 Develop a technique that utilizes the newly developed human error framework for 
the purpose of defect detection in requirements artifacts (i.e., Software 
Requirements Specifications). 
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The rest of this chapter defines the key terms relevant to this research, and describes the 
research framework developed for achieving the primary goals of this research. 
1.3. Definitions 
The discussion about software quality revolves around the use of a few important terms: 
error (human error), fault, and failure. These terms often have been used interchangeably in the 
software engineering literature. To alleviate confusion, this section provides a definition of each 
of these terms.    
1.3.1. Error, Fault, and Failure 
The definitions provided below are consistent with the definitions provided in the IEEE 
Standard Glossary [30–32]: 
Error – A flaw in human thought process that produces an incorrect result, such as 
software containing a fault. The flaw in human thought process may occur while trying to 
understand a given information, while solving a problem, or while using a method or a 
tool. An example of an error in the context of software requirements is: a lack of 
knowledge about the needs of the user or customer. 
Fault – A manifestation of an error within the software. In the context of software 
requirements, a requirements fault is a manifestation of an error that was committed 
during the requirements phase of software development.  
Failure - Termination of the ability of a product to perform a required function or its 
inability to perform within previously specified limits. From the perspective of software 
requirement specifications, failure is defined as the departure of the operational software 
system’s behavior from user expected requirements.   
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1.3.2. Software Inspections 
Software inspections are one of the most widely used methodologies for verification of 
software artifacts (e.g., requirements documents) for correctness, consistency, and completeness  
[13], [33]. The primary goal of software inspections is to uncover faults that get injected during 
the development of a software artifact. Examples of requirements faults include: incorrect 
requirement (i.e., a requirement which specifies a user need incorrectly), ambiguous requirement 
(a requirement that can be interpreted in multiple ways), and inconsistent requirements (i.e., 
requirements that contradict each other). Software inspections usually consist of three major 
steps: detection of faults, collection of faults, and repairing the artifact based on the collected 
faults [21]. A typical inspection consists of the following: 
• having inspectors independently review the software artifact to identify faults in 
the artifact (because this is the most important step in the inspection process, the 
inspectors need to be trained on a specific inspection technique before this step)  
• conducting a team meeting to agree on the faults and compile them in a single list 
• sending the list to the author/s of the artifact so that the artifact can be repaired 
(i.e., the faults identified during the inspection can be removed from the artifact)   
1.4. Research Framework  
In order to aid seamless integration of Cognitive Psychology research on human errors 
into Software Engineering research for attaining improved software quality, this dissertation has 
three major focal points (also depicted in Figure 1): 
I. Creation of a human error taxonomy:  
Create the taxonomy using the following major steps:  
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(1) Identify, from the Software Engineering literature, the human errors that occur during 
the requirements phase of the software development process. 
(2) Identify, from Cognitive Psychology literature, a human error classification system 
that is suitable for creating a taxonomy of requirements phase human errors.  
 (3) Integrate the human error information collected from Software Engineering literature 
with the human error theory identified from the Cognitive Psychology literature to create 
a taxonomy of requirements phase human errors.  
II. Empirical validation of the human error taxonomy: 
Validate the human error taxonomy as an effective quality improvement approach in 
controlled experimental settings (academic settings) and refine the human error taxonomy 
based on the results.     
III. Using the human error taxonomy to develop and validate techniques and tools for 
detecting human errors and faults in software requirements artifacts: 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
 
Creation of human 
error taxonomy
• Review Software 
Engineering literature 
to identify 
requirements phase 
human errors.
• Review Cognitive 
Psychology literature 
to identify a suitable 
human error 
classification system.
• Develop taxonomy of 
requirements phase 
human errors. 
Empirical validation of 
human error 
taxonomy 
• Have software 
developers perform 
error based inspection 
supported by the 
human error 
taxonomy under 
controlled settings to 
evaluate the 
usefulness of the 
human error 
taxonomy. 
• Refine the taxonomy 
using the results of 
the controlled 
experiments.
Develop requirements 
inspection techniques 
and tools. 
• Use the human error 
taxonomy as a basis 
for developing 
requirements defect 
detection technique 
and supplementary 
tools.
• Validate the proposed 
technique and its 
supplemetary tools. 
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 Develop a requirements defect detection (i.e., inspection) technique and its 
supplementary instrumentation. The supplementary instrumentation will include human 
error tools and trainings to assist inspectors. This part of the research framework will also 
include empirical validation of the newly developed defect detection approach to evaluate 
its usefulness during requirements inspections.    
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2. BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
This section describes limitations of the existing quality improvement approaches and 
how my dissertation aims to overcome those limitations (Section 2.1). Section 2.2 describes the 
cognitive psychology perspective on human errors and its usefulness in improving software 
quality. 
2.1. Software Quality Improvement Methods 
 The idea of a requirements inspection approach based on sources of faults (i.e. errors) 
was first proposed by Lanubile et al in 1998 [34]. Lanubile et al conceptualized the idea of 
abstraction of errors from an initial set of requirements faults (found using a traditional 
inspection approach like the fault-checklist approach), followed by re-inspection of requirements 
document guided by error information. 
Figure 2. Fault based inspections vs Error Abstraction based inspections   
 
Figure 2 shows the difference between the conventional fault-checklist based inspection 
vs the Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach proposed by Lanubile et al. The EAI 
requirements inspection approach adds an additional step to the conventional fault checklist 
based inspections. During the conventional fault based inspection process, first, the reviewers 
(inspectors) identify faults in the requirements document, and the document author then uses the 
Find Faults in 
Requirements
Use Faults to 
Fix 
Requirements
Original Requirements Repaired Requirements
Find Faults in 
Requirements
Use Errors and 
related Faults to 
Fix Requirements
Original Requirements Repaired Requirements
Abstract 
Errors From 
faults
 
 10 
reported faults to fix the requirements document. The Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) 
process, however introduces a new step wherein reviewers (inspectors) are asked to abstract 
errors from the previously discovered faults. The abstracted error information is used to identify 
additional faults related to the abstracted errors (this step is referred to as error-informed re-
inspection). The document author then receives the recovered list of errors and related faults, 
which he/she then use for repairing the requirements document. Abstracting error information 
has multiple goals, including but not limited to the following: 
• Help inspectors in focusing on those areas of the requirements document that may 
also have been impacted by errors abstracted during first round of inspection. 
• Help in providing an understanding of the real problems that occurred during the 
requirements development process. These problems are generally left undetected 
when the focus is on faults alone (traditional inspection approaches only focus on 
faults and not the underlying errors).  
• Abstracted error information helps in providing a better medium for conveying 
information required for repairing the document. This is because looking for the 
underlying problems (i.e., human errors) that caused fault-injection allows the 
document’s author/s to learn the actual problems with their requirements 
development process and then prevent the injection of the faults in future.    
Lanubile et al also provided evidence of the usefulness of the EAI approach via an 
empirical study [34]. During the study, a major drawback observed by Lanubile et al in their 
approach was that the process of error abstraction was heavily reliant on the creativity of 
reviewers (inspectors) while they are trying to retrospectively trace back the faults to the errors 
responsible for the faults. In other words, the error abstraction process used in Lanubile’s 
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approach did not provide support for the reviewers (inspectors) during the error abstraction 
activity. Walia & Carver tried to bridge this gap by proposing an error classification taxonomy 
that contained information about cause-effect relationship between errors and faults [23].   
The error classification taxonomy, titled Requirement Error Taxonomy (RET) was 
developed for the purpose of guiding the reviewers (inspectors) while they are trying to abstract 
errors from faults. Another purpose of the RET (Figure 3) was to provide a comprehensive list of 
the types of errors that generally occur during the requirements development process, so that 
inspectors do not rely simply on their ability or creativity to think of the errors that are 
responsible for the faults being analyzed. In order to develop the comprehensive list of 
requirement errors, Walia & Carver conducted an extensive literature survey [23] that 
encompassed not only Software Engineering Literature, but also surveyed human cognition 
research to evaluate if any of the human errors proposed in human cognition research can have 
corresponding errors in software requirements. The result of the literature survey conducted by 
Walia & Carver was the Requirement Error Taxonomy (shown in Figure 3), which grouped 
 
Figure 3. Requirement Error Taxonomy (RET) 
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requirement errors into three major categories: People Errors, Process Errors, and 
Documentation Errors. The People Errors category describes errors caused by the fallibilities of 
the people involved in the requirements development process. The Process Error category 
describes errors caused by selection of incorrect or inappropriate requirements engineering 
technique or process. Documentation Error category describes errors caused due to incorrectly 
organizing and specifying the requirements. 
Following the development of the RET, Walia & Carver conducted multiple empirical 
studies [29, 35–37] with the goal of: (1) validating whether the Error Abstraction and Inspection 
(EAI) process is an effective approach for identifying faults in requirements documents, (2) 
validating whether the Requirement Error Taxonomy or RET is a useful addition to Lanubile’s 
EAI process, and (3) validating if integration of cognitive psychology research with software 
engineering research is useful for software quality improvement. The results from the empirical 
studies conducted by Walia & Carver [29] highlighted the following key observations: 
• The results of the empirical studies validated that not only does EAI (guided by 
RET) provides an improvement in inspectors’ fault detection effectiveness when 
compared to fault-based inspection, RET was also found to have a very positive 
impression on the participants of the studies with regards to its usefulness in 
helping them locate faults. 
• The results of the empirical studies highlighted that the People Error class (errors 
caused by fallibilities of individuals involved in requirements development) of 
RET was reported to be the source of a significantly large number of faults (up to 
32% of the faults were traced back to People Errors).  
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The observation that People Errors were found responsible for a majority of faults in 
requirements documents was of particular interest and a major motivational factor for the 
research described in the current dissertation. Although, RET was found to be useful and 
effective, RET was lacking in a direct tie-in with the research performed by Cognitive 
Psychologists on human errors and the psychological processes that produce human errors. 
Furthermore, even though RET did try to identify human errors that could have corresponding 
requirements errors, it failed to evaluate each of the identified errors from the perspective of 
whether or not the error qualified as a failure of human cognition (i.e., human error).  
A major limitation of RET was that it was created without reference to psychological 
theories of how human errors occur, and the observation that People Errors of RET were found 
to be responsible for a significantly large number of faults were the two primary motivational 
factors behind conducting the current research. The current research proposes to extend the work 
done by Walia & Carver on RET by creating a requirements phase human error taxonomy which 
is more strongly grounded in human error theories proposed in the Cognitive Psychology 
literature. Section 2.1 provides a brief review of the formal literature on human errors from a 
psychological perspective and the relevance of human error theories to Software Engineering 
domain. 
2.2. A Cognitive Psychology Perspective on Errors 
As defined in Section 1.3, the term error, in context of the current research is understood 
as failings of human cognition in the process of perception, judgement, problem-solving, 
decision-making, planning, and execution of the plan (i.e., acting). This failure of human 
cognition is often referred to as human errors or mental errors in the Cognitive Psychology 
literature. These errors, in turn produce faults, which are physical manifestation of error. These 
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faults, when left undetected, may result in system failure. This is to say that most of the system 
failures find their origin in a human cognition failure or human error.  
Human errors have been examined in domains such as aviation, medicine, and the oil 
industry. Cognitive Psychologists have developed domain-specific taxonomies of human errors 
that capture systematic failure in human-performance [2, 4, 24, 26–28, 38]. The commonality 
between the domain-specific taxonomies is that these taxonomies capitalize upon elementary 
theoretical research on human cognition. Often, these elementary human cognition theories or 
human error theories employ a human information-processing model that provides a coherent 
account of human errors that are committed by people when they are performing different tasks. 
Cognitive Psychologists argue that human errors generally are not the result of irrational or 
maladaptive tendencies, but instead result from “normal, useful psychological processes gone 
awry” [39]. Hence, human errors can be organized around the normal psychological processes 
that an individual goes through when performing any task. 
Similar to domains like aviation, medicine etc., Software Engineering is a process 
dependent upon human operators and hence is susceptible to human errors (human cognition 
failures). Human errors in software engineering arise during information processing, particularly 
as information is translated from one form to another (for example, during requirements 
development when customer needs are translated into formal requirements specifications). The 
current research proposes that application of human error research to Software Engineering 
offers great promise for reducing faults and improving software quality. 
Cognitive scientists have proposed several human error classification systems e.g., 
Human Factors Analysis & Classification system (or HFACS) [27], ‘Swiss Cheese’ model [39], 
Reason’s and Rasmussen’s taxonomy [39–43], and Norman’s classification [44] to show that 
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people’s judgments and decision-making can be erroneous when faced with different situations. 
The most prominent and widely respected human error classification system is the one proposed 
by James Reason [3, 4, 26–28]. James Reason, in his seminal book titled, Human Error [39], 
proposed a general classification system of human errors, wherein human errors are organized 
around a very simple model of human information-processing. Reason proposes that there are 
three general processes a human operator goes through in order to perform an action: (1) sensing 
and perceiving information, (2) processing the information and making a decision about which 
action/s to take, and (3) taking action. Figure 4 shows the general human information-processing 
model proposed by Reason. Human errors can originate in any of the three processes shown in 
Figure 4. 
               Reason defines the human errors associated with the three processes into three broad 
categories: slips, lapses, and mistakes. Slips and lapses happen while executing the planned 
action (taking action), whereas mistakes happen during the perception, processing, and decision 
making stages. Reason further provides the underlying cognitive failure mechanisms behind 
slips, lapses and mistakes (shown in Figure 5). As can be seen in Figure 5, slips and lapses occur 
due to inattention and memory failures, respectively, and mistakes occur due to inadequate 
formulation of plan. Inadequate formulation of plan often is due to lack of knowledge or 
inadequate application of procedures/rules to a given situation. 
 
Figure 4. General Human Information-Processing Model Proposed by Reason 
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Reason’s classification establishes a very strong association between the human 
information-processing model and cognitive failure mechanisms like inattention, memory 
failures, and lack of knowledge. This makes Reason’s human error classification system easily 
applicable and adaptable to any domain. Another benefit of applying Reason’s model of slips, 
lapses and mistakes to the Software Engineering domain is that the information-processing 
stages software engineers undergo are similar to the ones on which Reason’s classification is 
built upon: process user needs, make decisions about project plan, and execute (implement) the 
plan. 
The current research makes an effort to adapt the theoretical research on human errors 
(specifically the research done by James Reason) to the software engineering domain. The 
current research also provides evidence that such an adaptation will provide an improved 
understanding of the means to detect and remove software engineering human errors and the 
corresponding faults, and consequently have a positive impact on software process & product 
 
Figure 5. Human Error Model Proposed by Reason 
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quality. The next chapter provides the development process of a requirements engineering 
human error taxonomy in which requirements engineering human errors are organized around 
Reason’s slips, lapses, and mistakes. 
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3. IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS ENGINEERING 
HUMAN ERRORS 
This chapter describes the research approach used to develop the Human Error 
Taxonomy (HET) that describes the most commonly occurring requirements engineering human 
errors and classifies them into Reason’s slips, lapses, and mistakes. Section 3.1 describes the 
systematic literature review as a research method for developing the HET, and Section 3.2 
provides the major outcomes of the systematic review process. 
3.1. Systematic Review Process for Developing Human Error Taxonomy 
This systematic literature review was conducted to identify and classify the requirements 
phase human errors reported in the Software Engineering (SE) literature. Systematic Literature 
Review (SLR) is a specific methodology of research, which was developed in order to gather and 
analyze the available state of knowledge pertaining to a topic [45–47]. As the name suggests, a 
systematic literature review follows a very well formulated and strictly structured method, 
referred to as the review protocol. The review protocol is created by:  
• first, expressing the focused research topic (which is being investigated) as one or 
more structured question/s using specific terms and concepts that are relevant and 
must be addressed in order to collect as much information about the topic as 
possible, and 
• second, creating strategies to retrieve the information around the pre-defined 
structured question/s. 
The review protocol needs to be explicitly defined so that other researchers can reproduce 
the same procedure and be able to evaluate whether the protocol defined for the focused topic is 
adequate to retrieve as much information about the topic as possible. 
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An effective systematic review is one that is driven by an overall goal. In the current 
systematic review, the high-level goal was: 
What types of human errors that occur during the requirements phase can be 
identified in the literature and how can human error theories help in creating a 
classification system for those human errors? 
The high-level question was further decomposed into two detailed research questions. 
The purpose of the first detailed research question was to identify the human errors reported in 
Software Engineering (SE) literature, and the purpose of the second research question was to 
organize the identified human errors into a taxonomy. Table 2 provides the two detailed research 
questions. 
Table 2. Research Questions for the Systematic Literature Review 
# Research Question 
RQ1 What types of requirements engineering human errors does the software engineering 
and psychology literature describe? 
RQ2  How can we organize the human errors identified in RQ1 into a taxonomy?  
  
Subsections 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.3 describe the rest of the review protocol (Source 
Selection, Primary Study Selection, and Data Extraction). 
3.1.1. Source Selection and Search 
The systematic review that I conducted was an extension and replication of the review 
conducted by Walia et al [23]. Therefore, to identify relevant publications, I used the same 
search strings that were used by Walia et al. The search strings were executed in IEEExplore, 
INSPEC, ACM Digital Library, SCIRUS (Elsevier), Google Scholar, PsychINFO (EBSCO), and 
Science Citation Index. Because Walia et al included papers published through 2006 in their 
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review, I only searched for studies published after 2006 (through October 2014). Table 3 
provides the detailed search strings. 
Table 3. Search Strings [23] 
String# Search Focus Detailed Search string 
1 Software quality 
improvement 
approach 
((software OR development OR application OR product OR project) AND (quality OR condition 
OR character OR property OR attribute OR aspect) AND (improvement OR enhancement OR 
advancement OR upgrading OR ameliorate OR betterment) AND (approach OR process OR system 
OR technique OR methodology OR procedure OR mechanism OR plan OR pattern)) 
2 Software inspection 
methods 
((software OR development OR application OR product OR project) AND (inspection OR 
assessment OR evaluation OR examination OR review OR measurement) AND (approach OR 
process OR system OR technique OR methodology OR procedure OR mechanism OR plan OR 
pattern)) 
3 Error abstraction OR 
root causes 
(error OR mistake OR problem OR reason OR fault OR defect OR imperfection OR flaw OR lapse 
OR slip OR err) AND (abstraction OR root cause OR cause)) 
4 Requirement stage 
errors 
((requirement OR specification) AND (phase OR stage OR situation OR division OR period OR 
episode OR part OR state OR facet) AND (error OR mistake OR problem OR reason OR fault OR 
defect OR imperfection OR flaw OR lapse OR slip OR err)) 
5 Software 
error/fault/defect 
taxonomy 
((software OR development OR application OR product OR project) AND (error OR mistake OR 
problem OR reason OR fault OR defect OR imperfection OR flaw OR lapse OR slip OR err) AND 
(taxonomy OR classification OR categorization OR grouping OR organization OR terminology OR 
systematization)) 
6 Human error 
classification 
((human OR cognitive OR individual OR psychological) AND (error OR mistake OR problem OR 
reason OR fault OR defect OR imperfection OR flaw OR lapse OR slip OR err) AND (taxonomy 
OR classification OR categorization OR grouping OR organization OR terminology OR 
systematization)) 
 
3.1.2. Study Selection 
During the first phase, called title-elimination phase, a total of 280 studies were identified 
by running the search strings on the various publication databases. Next, the abstracts and 
keywords were read to exclude any studies that were clearly unrelated to the research questions. 
At the end of this stage, the list contained 96 studies.  
Next, the full-text of the 96 remaining studies was reviewed. The inclusion/exclusion 
criteria shown in Table 4 was used to examine the full-text of the 96 studies. This step resulted in 
34 studies remaining. 
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Table 4. Inclusion-Exclusion Criteria 
RQ Inclusion Criteria (Specific to RQ’s) Exclusion Criteria (same 
for both RQ’s) 
1 
 
- Papers that focus on using human errors for improving software 
quality 
- Empirical studies (qualitative or quantitative) of using human error 
information in the software development lifecycle 
- Papers that provide errors, mistakes, or problems in the software 
development lifecycle. 
- Papers that provide error, fault, or defect classifications. 
- Empirical studies (qualitative or quantitative) that provide causal 
analysis or root causes of software defects. 
- Papers based only on 
expert opinion 
- Short-papers, introductions 
to special issues, tutorials, 
and mini-tracks 
- Papers not related to any 
of the research questions 
- Preliminary conference 
versions of included journal 
papers 
- Studies whose findings are 
unclear and ambiguous. 2 
- Papers from the psychology literature about models of human error. 
- Papers from the cognitive psychology literature about human the 
thought process, planning, human reasoning or problem solving. 
- Empirical studies (qualitative or quantitative) on human errors. 
- Papers describing various human error classification systems. 
 
Next, four additional studies were identified through snowballing (i.e., searching through 
the references of the 34 remaining studies). This step resulted in 38 included studies. Fig. 6 
summarizes the search and selection process. 
3.1.3. Data Extraction 
 Based on the type of information contained in the primary study, we classified 11 
primary studies as Cognitive Psychology studies and 27 studies as Software Engineering studies. 
The Cognitive Psychology papers focused on models of human errors. The Software Engineering 
studies primarily focused on human errors committed during the process of software 
 
Figure 6. Study Selection Process 
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development. The content and focus of these two types of studies was different, and hence 
different types of data was extracted from them.  
Note that studies included by Walia et al in their review [23] were reanalyzed and data 
was extracted from these studies as well. Table 5 lists the common data extracted from all 
studies. Table 6 lists the data extracted based on each primary study’s research focus. Using 
these data extraction forms, information was extracted from the studies. 
Table 5. Common Data Items for Extracting Information 
Data item Description 
Study Identifier Unique identifier for the paper (same as the reference number) 
Bibliographic data Author, year, title, source 
Type of article Journal/conference/technical report 
Focus of Area The field in which the research was conducted e.g., Software Engineering or Industrial 
Engineering or Psychology or Aviation or Medicine 
Study aims The aims or goals of the primary study 
Context Relates to one/more search focus, i.e., research area(s) the paper focuses upon. 
Study type Industrial experiment, controlled experiment, survey, lessons learned. 
Unit of analysis Individual developers or department or organizational 
Control Group Yes, no; if ‘‘Yes”: number of groups and size per group 
Data collection How the data was collected, e.g., interviews, questionnaires, measurement forms, 
observations, and discussion. 
Data analysis How the data was analyzed; qualitative, quantitative or mixed 
Concepts The key concepts or major ideas in the primary studies 
Higher-order 
interpretations 
The second- (and higher-) order interpretations arising from the key concepts of the 
primary studies. This can include limitations, guidelines or any additional information 
arising from application of major ideas/concepts 
Study findings Major findings and conclusions from the primary study 
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Table 6. Data Items Related to Each Search Focus 
Search 
Focus 
Data Item Description 
Quality 
Improvement 
Approach 
Focus or process Focus of the quality improvement approach and the process/method used to improve quality 
Benefits Any benefits from applying the approach identified 
Limitations Any limitations or problems identified in the approach 
Evidence The empirical evidence indicating the benefits of using error information to improve software quality 
and any specific errors found 
Error focus Yes or No; and if ‘‘Yes”, classify the solution foundation (next data item) 
Mechanism or 
Solution 
Foundation 
1. Ad hoc - just something the investigators thought up but could have been supported by empirical 
work showing its effectiveness; or 
2. Evidence-based — a notation of a systematic problem in the software engineering process that leads 
to a specific remediation method; or 
3. Theory-based — draws support from research on human errors 
Requirement 
Errors 
Problems Problems reported in requirement stage 
Errors Reported errors (if provided in the paper) at the requirements stage 
Faults Faults (if any information provided) at requirement stage 
Mechanism Process used to analyze or abstract requirement errors (select one of the following): 
1. Ad hoc - just something the investigators thought up but could have been supported by empirical 
work showing its effectiveness; or 
2. Evidence-based — a notation of a systematic problem in the software engineering process that leads 
to a specific remediation method; or 
3. Theory-based — draws support from research on human errors 
Error-fault-
defect 
taxonomies 
Focus The focus of the taxonomy (i.e., error, fault, or failure) 
Error Focus Yes or No; if ‘‘Yes”, What was the process used to classify errors into a taxonomy? 
Requirement phase Yes or No (whether it was applied in requirement phase) 
Benefits and 
Limitations 
Benefits and/or Limitations of the taxonomy 
Evidence The empirical evidence regarding the benefits of error/fault/defect taxonomy for software quality 
Software 
inspections 
Focus The focus of inspection method (i.e., error, fault of failure) 
Error Focus Yes or No; if ‘‘Yes”, how did it focus reviewers’ attention to detect errors during the inspection 
Requirement phase Yes or No (Did it inspect requirement documents?) 
Evidence The empirical evidence regarding the benefits/limitations of error-based inspection method 
Human errors 
Human errors and 
classifications 
Description of errors made by human beings and classes of their fallibilities during planning, decision 
making and problem solving 
Evidence The empirical evidence regarding errors made by humans in different situations (e.g., aircraft control) 
that are related to requirement errors 
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3.2. Results of the Systematic Review Process 
This section is organized around the two research questions (shown in Table 2) that were 
driving this systematic literature review.  
3.2.1. RQ1: Type of Requirements Engineering Human Errors Described in Literature 
To start with, individual errors, error categories, error-descriptions, and root causes were 
extracted from the 38 primary studies. Similarly, the published systematic review paper written 
by Walia et al [23] was analyzed and errors and their descriptions were extracted. An 
examination of this extracted information revealed multiple interpretations of the term ‘error’. 
These interpretations included: software defects, program errors, requirements defects, 
requirements problems, end-user (or user) errors, and human error. 
Before building the taxonomy, items that were not truly human errors were removed. The 
output of this process was 31 human errors, listed in Table 7. 
At this point, the list of included studies in this review was also updated. First, only seven 
out of the 27 software engineering primary studies contained a true requirements engineering 
human error. Therefore, the other 20 studies were eliminated. Second, none of the Psychology 
studies contained any requirements engineering human errors. Hence, these studies were also 
excluded.  
Additionally, there were eleven (11) studies from the review paper published by Walia et 
al [23] that identified requirements engineering human errors. So, in total, eighteen (18) studies 
from the software engineering literature were included as they contain true requirements 
engineering human errors (see Appendix A for a list of the 18 studies that provided input to the 
Human Error Taxonomy). 
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Table 7. Human Errors Identified in Literature 
Error # Error Name Source (see Appendix A) 
1 Problem representation error  Huang et al., 2012 
2 RE people do not understand the problem  Lehtinen et al., 2014 
3 Assumptions in grey area.  Kumaresh 2010 
4 Wrong assumptions about stakeholder opinions  Lopes and Forster 2013 
5 Lack of cohesion  Lopes and Forster 2013 
6 Loss of information from stakeholders  Lopes and Forster 2013 
7 Assumption that insufficient requirements are ok  Lehtinen et al., 2014 
8 Low understanding of each other’s roles  Bjamason et al., 2011 
9 Not having a clear demarcation between client and users  Kushwaha 2006 
10 Mistaken belief that it is impossible to specify NFRs in a verifiable form Firesmith 2007 
11 Accidentally overlooking requirements  Firesmith 2007 
12 Ignoring some requirements engineering tasks  Firesmith 2007 
13 Inadequate Requirements Process  Firesmith 2007 
14 Mistaken assumptions about the problem space  Walia et al 2009 
15 Environment errors   Walia et al 2009 
16 Information Management errors  Walia et al 2009 
17 Lack of awareness of sources of requirements  Walia et al 2009 
18 Application errors Walia et al 2009 
19 Requirements developer did not understand some aspect of the product or process  Walia et al 2009 
20 User needs not well-understood or interpreted by different stakeholders  Walia et al 2009 
21 Lack of understanding of the system  Walia et al 2009 
22 Lack of system knowledge  Walia et al 2009 
23 Not understanding some parts of the problem domain  Walia et al 2009 
24 Misunderstandings caused by working simultaneously with several different software systems 
and domains  
Walia et al 2009 
25 Misunderstanding of some aspect of the overall functionality of the system  Walia et al 2009 
26 Problem-Solution errors  Walia et al 2009 
27 Misunderstanding of problem solution processes Walia et al 2009 
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Table 7. Human Errors Identified in Literature (continued) 
Error # Error Name Source (see Appendix A) 
28 Semantic errors  Walia et al 2009 
29 Syntax errors  Walia et al 2009 
30 Clerical errors  Walia et al 2009 
31 Carelessness while documenting requirements  Walia et al 2009 
 
Table 8. Human Error Taxonomy (HET) 
Reason’s 
Taxonomy 
Human Error Class Human Error(s) from 
Table 7 
Slips Clerical Errors 30, 31 
Lack of consistency in the requirement specification 5 
Lapses Loss of information from stakeholders 6 
Accidentally overlooking requirements 11 
Mistakes Application Errors 18, 25 
Solution Choice Errors 26, 27 
Syntactic Errors 28, 29 
Wrong Assumptions 3, 4, 14 
Environment Errors 15 
Information management Errors 16 
Poor understanding of one another’s roles 8 
Not having a clear distinction between client an users 9 
Mistaken belief that it is impossible to specify non-functional requirements in a verifiable form 10 
Inadequate requirements process 13 
Lack of awareness of requirements sources 17 
Violations Assumption that insufficient requirements are ok 7 
Ignoring some requirements engineering tasks 12 
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3.2.2. RQ2: Organizing the Human Errors Identified in RQ1 into a Taxonomy 
To create the human error taxonomy (HET), two steps were followed. First, the 
individual errors in Table 7 were examined and grouped into classes based on similarities. 
These analyses were performed by studying the description provided for the error by the 
primary study that supplied the error. Human error expert, Dr. Gary Bradshaw (Professor, 
Cognitive Science Program, Mississippi State University) evaluated the final classification, 
which is shown in Table 8. 
Then, the error classes were organized into Reason’s Slips, Lapses, Mistakes taxonomy. 
For this organization, each error class was analyzed to (i) decide whether it was a planning or an 
execution error and (ii) for execution errors, decide whether the error was related to attention 
failures (slips) or memory failures (lapses).  
Note that the last two rows of Table 8 contain intentional violations (i.e., deliberately 
failing to follow rules), which are different from unintentional errors (slips, lapses, and 
mistakes). The human error taxonomy covers only unintentional errors. Hence, the taxonomy 
excludes violations. Figure 7 shows the final outcome (i.e., the Human Error Taxonomy) of 
answering RQ1.  
In order to make the error classes in Table 8 (or Figure 7) more understandable, a 
description of each class along with an example error and fault is provided in Tables 9, 10, and 
11. For the examples given in the tables, the Loan Arranger (LA) system is used. The 
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requirements for Loan Arranger (LA) system were developed by researchers for use in software 
quality research. A brief overview of LA system is provided in the next paragraph. 
Loan Arranger (LA) overview: A loan consolidation organization purchases loans from 
banks and bundles them for resale to other investors. The LA application selects an optimal 
bundle of loans based on criteria provided by an investor. These criteria may include: 1) risk 
level, 2) principal involved, and 3) expected rate of return. The loan analyst can then modify the 
bundle as needed for the investor. LA system automates information management activities, such 
as updating loan information monthly. 
Table 9. Slip Errors in Human Error Taxonomy (HET) 
Error Name Description Example of error Example of fault 
Clerical errors Result from carelessness while performing 
mechanical transcriptions from one format or 
from one medium to another. Requirement 
examples include carelessness while 
documenting specifications from elicited user 
needs. 
Error: The requirement author understood the 
difference between regular loans (amount <= 
$275,000) and jumbo loans (amount > $275,000). 
But, while documenting the requirements, s/he 
recorded the same information for both types of 
loans. 
Fault: The requirements for 
the jumbo loans incorrectly 
specify the same behavior 
as for regular loans 
Lack of consistency 
in the requirement 
specification errors 
Occur when requirement authors do not 
articulate or organize the requirements in a 
consistent manner, even when they have a clear 
idea of user needs. This error leads to a 
disjointed requirements specification, which 
makes interpretation difficult. 
Error: The requirement author is not consistent 
with his/her use of terminology. The same concept 
is referred to by different terms throughout the 
document. 
Fault: Use of terms: 
“marked for inclusion” and 
“identified for inclusion” to 
convey the same 
information. 
 
  
Figure 7. Human Error taxonomy (HET) 
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Table 10. Lapse Errors in Human Error Taxonomy (HET) 
Error Name Description Example of error Example of fault 
Loss of 
information from 
stakeholders 
errors 
Result from a requirement author forgetting, 
discarding or failing to store information or 
documents provided by stakeholders, e.g. some 
important user need 
Error: A loan analyst informs the requirement 
author about the format for reports (file, screen, 
or printout) from a loan analyst, but forgets to 
note it down 
Fault: Information about the 
report formats is omitted 
from the requirement 
specification. 
Accidentally 
overlooking 
requirement errors 
occur when the stakeholders who are the source of 
requirements assume that some requirements are 
obvious and fail to verbalize them 
Error: Because stakeholders assume that 
abnormal termination and system recovery is a 
commonplace occurrence and will be handled by 
the requirement analysts or the system design 
team, they do not provide system recovery 
requirements.   
Fault: Requirement document 
does not describe the process 
of system recovery from 
abnormal termination. 
 
Table 11. Mistake Errors in Human Error Taxonomy (HET) 
Error Name Description Example of error Example of fault 
Application errors arise from a misunderstanding of the 
application or problem domain or a 
misunderstanding of some aspect of overall 
system functionality 
Error: The requirements author lacks 
domain knowledge about loans, 
investing, and borrowing. As a result she 
incorrectly believes that the stakeholders 
have told her all information required to 
decide when to remove loans that are in 
a default status from the repository. 
Fault: The requirements specification 
omits the requirement to retain 
information about borrowers who are 
in default status (even after the 
corresponding loans are deleted from 
the system). 
Environment errors  Result from lack of knowledge about the 
available infrastructure that supports the 
development of a given project. This 
infrastructure includes tools, templates, or 
other items of infrastructure that support the 
elicitation, understanding, or documentation of 
software requirements. 
Error: The requirement authors did not 
use a standard template for documenting 
the requirements (for example, the IEEE 
standard template for SRS) because they 
were unaware of the presence of such a 
template. Therefore, the author did not 
use right tools. 
Fault: Requirements about system 
scope and performance were omitted. 
Information 
Management errors 
Result from a lack of knowledge about 
standard requirement engineering or 
documentation practices and procedures within 
the organization 
Error: It is common procedure within the 
organization that requirement 
specifications include error-handling 
information about which mechanisms 
are invoked when error occur. This 
specification does not contain any 
information about error-handling 
information. 
Fault: Specification does not indicate 
that an error message should be 
displayed regarding errors rather than 
just returning to a previous screen with 
no notification. 
Wrong Assumption 
errors 
Occur when the requirements author has a 
mistaken assumption about system features or 
stakeholder opinions 
Error: Requirements author assumes that 
error-handling is a task common to all 
software projects and will be handled by 
programmers. Therefore, s/he does not 
gather that information from 
stakeholders. 
Fault: Information about what happens 
when a lender provides invalid data 
has been omitted. 
Poor understanding 
of one another’s 
roles 
Domain knowledge and perspectives vary 
between roles, which necessitates considerable 
communication among members of the 
software engineering team. Without proper 
understanding of developer roles, 
communication gaps may arise, either by 
failing to communicate at all (due to lack of 
understanding that other roles are impacted) or 
by ineffective communication (e.g. missing 
tacit requirements due to lack of insight into 
the customer’s domain.) 
Error: It was not clear among team 
members, who needed to elicit the 
requirements of a bank lender, which 
affected the participation of an important 
stakeholder during the requirements 
process. 
Fault: Omitted functionality as 
requirements of a bank lender (i.e., the 
LA application system to handle both 
fixed rate loans and adjustable rate 
loans) were not recorded in the 
specification. 
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Table 11. Mistake Errors in Human Error Taxonomy (HET) (continued) 
Error Name Description Example of error Example of fault 
Mistaken belief that 
it is impossible to 
specify non-
functional 
requirements in a 
verifiable form 
Major causes of this problem are the prevalent 
myths that it is too costly, too difficult, and 
even impossible to produce good requirements, 
especially nonfunctional requirements, during 
the software engineering process. These myths 
are especially prevalent with regard to quality 
and specialty engineering requirements (e.g., 
availability, interoperability, performance, 
portability, safety, security, and usability), 
where there is still a prevailing but mistaken 
belief that it is impossible to specify these 
requirements in a verifiable form. 
Error: An absence of any performance, 
security, usability, or availability 
requirements suggests that all non-
functional requirements were 
overlooked.  
Fault: Omission of performance 
requirements, security requirements 
and other non-functional requirements. 
Not having a clear 
distinction between 
client and users    
If RE practitioners are not able to distinguish 
between clients and end users, or do not realize 
that the clients are distinct from the end users, 
they may fail to gather and analyze the end 
users’ requirements  
Error: The requirement-gathering person 
failed to gather information from the 
actual end user of LA system, the Loan 
Analyst. 
Fault: No functional requirement to 
edit loan information has been 
specified whereas ‘Purpose’ specifies 
loans can be edited. 
Lack of awareness 
of requirement 
sources 
Requirements gathering person is not aware of 
all stakeholders which he/she should contact in 
order to gather the complete set of user needs. 
Sources of requirements include all different 
types of end users of the system being built and 
all the decision-makers from project 
sponsoring organization (also called the 
customers or the clients) 
Error: Requirement gathering person 
was not aware of all end users and 
clients and did not gather the needs of a 
bank lender (one of the end users of LA 
system). This end user wanted the LA 
system to handle both fixed rate loans 
and adjustable rate loans. 
Fault: Omitted functionality as 
requirements only considers fixed rate 
loans. 
Solution Choice (or 
Problem Solution) 
errors 
Are due to not knowing, misunderstanding, or 
misuse of problem solution processes. This 
kind of errors occur in the process of finding a 
solution for a stated and well-understood 
problem. If RE analysts do not understand the 
correct use of problem-solving methods and 
techniques, they might end up analyzing the 
problem incorrectly, and choose the wrong 
solution 
Error: Lack of knowledge of the 
requirement engineering process and 
requirement engineering terminology on 
part of the analysts. The analyst does not 
understand what kind of requirements 
are performance requirements and what 
kind of requirements are functional 
requirements.   
Fault: A particular requirement listed 
under performance requirement should 
be a functional requirement. 
Inadequate 
Requirements 
Process 
Errors occur when the requirement authors do 
not fully understand all of the requirement 
engineering steps necessary to ensure the 
software is complete and inadvertently omit 
one or more steps from the plan. 
Error: Requirement engineering plan did 
not have sufficient requirement 
traceability measures to link 
requirements to user needs. 
Fault: An extraneous requirement that 
allows loan analysts to change 
borrower information is included that 
could result in unwanted functionality 
and unnecessary work for the 
developers. 
Syntax errors Occur when a requirement author 
misunderstand the grammatical rules of natural 
language or the rules, symbols, or standards in 
a formal specification language like UML. 
Error: The requirements engineer 
misunderstood the use of navigability 
arrows to illustrate that one use case 
extends another.  
Fault:  An association link between 
two classes on a UML diagram lacks a 
navigability arrow to indicate the 
directionality of association resulting a 
diagram that is ambiguous and can be 
misunderstood. 
 
3.3. Evaluating the Usefulness of Human Error Taxonomy (HET) 
After the development of the HET, its usefulness for error and fault detection was 
evaluated via empirical studies that were conducted in academic settings. From a requirements 
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defect detection perspective, my research proposes that, a deeper understanding of the errors that 
affected the development of a particular requirements artifact can lead requirements engineers to 
detect faults that are often overlooked during traditional inspections. To that end, feasibility 
studies were conducted to determine whether software developers can use the HET to improve 
their defect detection ability during a requirements inspection. The next chapter describes the 
design and execution of the studies that evaluated the usefulness of HET for requirements defect 
detection.  
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4. VALIDATION OF THE HUMAN ERROR TAXONOMY 
As mentioned earlier, the Human Error Taxonomy (HET) was constructed with the goal 
of using the taxonomy as a basis for developing requirements defect/fault detection (i.e., 
requirements inspection) techniques. Therefore, a primary goal of my dissertation is to develop 
and empirically validate human error based (i.e. HET based) requirements inspection (i.e., fault 
detection) tools and techniques. In order to evaluate the usefulness of HET as a requirements 
fault detection tool, a formal Error Abstraction and inspection (EAI) approach is employed. The 
EAI approach adds an additional step to the traditional Fault Checklist (FC) based inspection. 
The extra step consists of assisting inspectors in identifying underlying human errors (abstracted 
from the faults found during the FC inspection). Inspectors then use the abstracted human error 
information to re-inspect SRS (Software Requirements Specification document) for additional 
faults.  
The usefulness of the human error taxonomy (HET) during requirements inspections was 
evaluated in three controlled experiments, two of which were conducted at North Dakota State 
University (NDSU), and one was conducted at University of Alabama (UA) at Tuscaloosa. 
While the major goal of the studies was same - to evaluate the usefulness of human errors 
taxonomy for requirements fault detection – the designs were slightly different from each other 
to gather insights about different aspects of using human error taxonomy (HET) for requirements 
fault detection (example of these aspects include relevance of HET’s human error classes to 
requirements engineering).  
This chapter first discusses, in Section 4.1, the overarching Research Questions that these 
three controlled studies answered. Next, in Section 4.2, details about each study’s design are 
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provided. Section 4.3 provides the results of analyzing the data gathered during the three studies. 
Essentially, Section 4.3 provides the answers for the research questions described in Section 4.1.  
4.1. Research Questions for Empirical Validation of the Human Error Taxonomy 
As mentioned earlier, this section provides the main research questions that were 
formulated to enable data collection for evaluating the usefulness of the human error taxonomy 
for requirements fault detection. Table 12 provides the Research Questions that the three 
empirical studies (described in this chapter) provided data for. 
Table 12. Research Questions for Evaluating Usefulness of the HET 
# Research Question 
RQ1 Does the Human Error Taxonomy improve the fault detection effectiveness of 
inspectors when compared to existing requirements inspection techniques?  
RQ2  Does the Human Error Taxonomy provide a useful method of understanding and 
classifying the human errors and faults made during development of a Software 
Requirements Specification document?  
          
4.2. Description of Designs of the Three Empirical Studies 
This section provides the designs of the three controlled studies that provided data for 
answering the research questions described in Table 12. In this section, designs of the three 
studies are provided, and next in Section 4.3, the data analysis and results (based on the research 
questions shown in Table 12) are provided.  
4.2.1. Experiment Design for Study 1 (A Control Group Study) 
Study 1 compared the fault (or defect) detection effectiveness of the Human Error 
Taxonomy with that of an existing error taxonomy called Requirement Error Taxonomy. The 
Requirement Error Taxonomy (RET) [23] was an initial foray into error taxonomy based 
inspections, but it was found that RET lacked a strong grounding in Cognitive Psychology 
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theories. This lack of connection with Cognitive Psychology theories was one of the motivations 
behind creation of the Human Error Taxonomy. Study 1 was designed to evaluate if the updated 
human error taxonomy (i.e., HET) offers an improvement over RET (a proven verification 
technique) during requirements inspection. To that end, a randomized pre-test post-test control 
group experiment was executed in controlled settings. The control group used RET, whereas the 
experimental group used the newly developed HET to perform requirements inspection. 
The participants in this study were 46 computer science students, enrolled in the 
Principles of Software Engineering course at North Dakota State University (NDSU). The course 
required students to work in teams (teams were selected by the instructor prior to this study) to 
develop Software Requirements Specification (SRS) documents for different software systems. 
To enable a comparison between HET vs. RET, participants were randomly divided in each team 
into two equal groups (a control group that used RET and an experiment group that used HET). 
Figure 8 shows the division of participants into three teams (e.g., team 1 had 16 participants) and 
subdivision of each team into treatment groups (8 used RET and 8 used HET). 
During the training (pre-test), the participants (23 in experimental group and 23 in control 
group) were trained on their respective taxonomies (HET for experimental and RET for control 
group) by having them perform an error based inspection of an external SRS document that was 
seeded with 30 realistic faults. The SRS used during the training specified requirements for a 
Parking Garage Control System (PGCS). During the post-test, participants inspected the SRS’s 
that they had developed (as part of a team). Members of Team 1 developed and inspected the 
SRS for Fly-by system, an airline reservation and travel management system. Team 2 developed 
and inspected the SRS for Campus Reconnection system, a student information and course 
management system. Team 3 developed and inspected the SRS for FaceSpace system, an online 
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music streaming system. As shown in Figure 8, half of the participants within each team 
inspected their own SRS using HET (e.g., 8 in team 1) or RET (other 8 in team 1), depending on 
the treatment group they were assigned during the pre-test. A detailed descriptions of the various 
experimental steps performed by participants appears in Table 13. 
Table 13. Steps Performed by Participants during Study 1 
Experimental Step Description 
Pretest 
Steps 
Training on HET 
and RET 
Participants were trained on the requirements inspections and the different type of requirement faults. Next, in two separate 
sessions, 23 participants were trained on HET and 23 participants were trained on RET. The training involved teaching the 
participants about the error abstraction using HET/RET (i.e., how to identify errors from faults), and using the abstracted 
error information to perform fault inspection (i.e., how to locate new faults). 
Error Abstraction After the training, participants were given 10 faults in PGCS SRS (chosen randomly from 30 seeded faults). Participants 
then used HET/RET to abstract and classify errors from the 10 given faults. This step resulted in 46 error forms (23 for RET 
and 23 for HET). 
Fault Inspection The participants then used the abstracted error information (from error forms) to locate additional faults in the PGCS SRS 
(i.e. participants re-inspected PGCS SRS using errors). This step resulted in 46 fault-forms (23 for HET and 23 for RET) 
containing new faults in PGCS SRS. 
SRS development Participants then worked in their respective teams (three teams) to develop requirements specification documents or SRS 
for different systems. 
Post-test steps: error-inspection 
on self-created SRS 
During the post-test, each participants inspected their own SRS (which they had developed as a team) using the technique 
that were trained during the pre-test (HET or RET) and reported faults. For example, of the 16 participants in Team 1, 8 
used HET while the other 8 used RET to inspect the “Fly-by” SRS. This step produced 46 individual fault-forms. 
Post-study Survey and Focus 
Group 
The experimental group and the control group participants rated HET and RET across various usefulness categories on a 5-
point scale (ranging from “1 – not useful” to “5 – very useful”). A focus group discussion was conducted in order to 
understand the problems faced by participants while using HET/RET to find faults. 
 
Figure 8. Experiment Procedure: Assignment of Participants, Artifacts and Output 
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4.2.2. Experiment Design for Study 2 (A Feasibility Study) 
Similar to the control group study described in Section 4.2.1, the major goal of Study 2 
(which was conducted at University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa) was to evaluate the feasibility of 
using the Human Error Taxonomy (HET) to support the requirements inspection process. Study 
2 also focused on analyzing whether the HET is useful for classifying errors and for guiding 
inspectors to find additional faults.  
Table 14. Steps Performed by Participants during Study 2 
Experimental Step Description 
Training 1 - Fault checklist 
technique 
During this 15-minute training, participants were trained on how to use the fault checklist technique to 
inspect an SRS document. 
Step 1- First Inspection 
(Individual Inspection) 
Each participants was randomly assigned an SRS developed by another team. The participants used the 
fault checklist technique (from Training 1) to inspect (i.e., identify faults) in the assigned SRS. The output 
of Step 1 was 28 individual Fault Forms (one per participants). 
Step 2 - Team Meeting to 
Consolidate Faults 
Each team were provided with the individual Fault Forms submitted by the participants who inspected their 
SRS (from Step 1). Each team then worked as a group to examine these fault lists to first remove duplicates 
and then consolidate the faults into one single master list, which they documented on the Group Fault Form. 
The output of Step 2 was eight Group Fault Forms (one per team). 
Training 2 - Error 
abstraction and 
classification 
During this 40-minute session, participants were first trained on the error abstraction process, and then 
trained on the HET and how to use HET to abstract and classify requirements errors.  
Step 4 - Error-informed Re-
inspection of the SRS 
Using the errors abstracted during Step 3, each participants individually re-inspected their own SRS to 
identify any additional faults related to these errors (i.e. the faults that were not found by their classmates 
during Step 1). The participants documented the additional faults on a Re-inspection Form. The output of 
Step 4 was 28 individual Re-inspection Forms (one per participants). 
Step 5 - Coordinating the 
individual fault lists 
This step is similar to Step 2, except that each team used the faults found during the re-inspection (Step 4). 
Each team created a Final Group Fault Form, in which they reported the agreed-upon list of faults. The 
output of Step 5 was eight Final Group Fault Forms (one per team). 
Post-study Survey After completing all experimental steps, each participants provided feedback about the error abstraction 
process and the HET. 
 
The study’s participants were 28 senior-level undergraduate computer science students. 
The students were enrolled in the Fall’15 capstone project course at University of Alabama at 
Tuscaloosa. The primary goal of this course was for the student teams to undergo the entire 
software development process (requirements elicitation/documentation, design, implementation, 
and testing) in order to build a complete software system. Students were divided into eight three 
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or four-person teams by the course instructor (not part of the research team). Each team 
developed their own system.  
The inspection artifacts were the 8 SRS’s developed by the teams. A detailed description 
of the various experimental steps performed by participants during Study 2 appears in Table 14. 
The complete experimental package used for Study 2 can be found here: 
http://humanerrorinse.org/Studies/2015/Fall_UA. 
4.2.3. Experiment Design for Study 3 (Study to Evaluate the Educational Value of HET) 
Thirty-four (34) graduate students enrolled in the Software Development Processes 
course in North Dakota State University participated in Study 3. Students were trained on the 
Human Error Taxonomy (HET), and how to abstract human errors from faults. The primary 
focus of Study 3 was to evaluate whether performing error abstraction on faults found in an 
externally developed requirements document can help students understand requirement phase 
human errors. Table 15 provides the experimental steps performed during this study. 
Table 15. Steps Performed by Participants during Study 3 
Experimental Step Description 
Training - Error 
abstraction and 
classification 
During this 50-minute session, participants were trained on the HET, 
and how to use HET to abstract and classify requirements errors from 
faults.  
Error abstraction 
from faults in PGCS 
SRS. 
The students were given 10 randomly selected faults (from 30 seeded 
faults) in PGCS SRS and asked to analyze these 10 faults to abstract 
and classify human errors into one of the error class of HET. The 
result of this step was 34 individual error lists containing human 
errors (and their classifications) that may have occurred during 
creation of PGCS requirements 
Post-study survey The survey gathered students’ feedback on HET and their 
understanding of the human errors and cognitive failure mechanisms 
that affect the requirements development process 
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During the survey, participants rated usefulness of HET on a 5-point scale (ranging from 
“1- Strongly Disagree” to “5 – Strongly Agree”). The first category of survey questions 
evaluated students’ abilities to distinguish between human error types (slips, lapses, and 
mistakes). A second category of survey questions evaluated the usefulness of HET in helping 
students understand the requirement phase errors and the faults caused by the errors. 
4.3. Analysis of Data Gathered During Studies 1, 2, and 3  
 This section provides the results of analyzing the data gathered during Studies 1, 2, and 
3. This section is organized around the two research questions (see Section 4.1) that were 
formulated to validate the usefulness of the Human Error Taxonomy for requirements fault 
detection. The three studies (Studies 1, 2, and 3) were designed with the goal of collecting the 
data to answer the research questions described in Table 12. Experimental design for each of the 
three studies were provided in Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3, respectively. 
4.3.1. RQ1: Does the Human Error Taxonomy Improve the Fault Detection Effectiveness of 
Inspectors when Compared to Existing Requirements Inspection Techniques? 
Data gathered during Study 1 and Study 2 was analyzed to answer this research question. 
Study 1 was a control group study that compared the fault detection effectiveness provided by 
 
Figure 9. Study 1: Comparison of Average Number of Faults 
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HET vs fault detection effectiveness provided by RET (an existing requirements verification 
technique). During Study 1, experimental group participants who used HET found more faults 
than the control group participants who used RET for two out of three teams (as shown in Figure 
9). In terms of efficiency (faults per hour), during Study 1, participants who used HET 
(experiment group) found faults at a much faster rate than the participants who used RET 
(control group) for all three teams (as shown in Figure 10).  
 Independent sample t-tests were run for both effectiveness and efficiency for all three 
teams. It was found that although the participants who used HET generally performed better than 
the participants using RET, the effectiveness and efficiency improvement was not statistically 
significant. With respect to effectiveness, the p-values obtained during the independent measures 
t-tests were 0.684, 0.866, and 0.705 for Teams 1, 2, and 3 respectively, indicating that HET 
group did not found significantly more faults. With respect to efficiency, the p-values obtained 
during the t-tests were 0.835, 0.536, and 0.608 for Teams 1, 2, and 3 respectively indicating that 
the efficiency for HET group was not significantly better than RET group. 
 
Figure 10.  Study 1: Comparison of Average Fault Rate or Efficiency (faults/hour) 
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Study 2 was a feasibility study that evaluated whether software development teams are 
able to use human error information to find additional faults that they were not able to find 
during a traditional fault-checklist based inspection. Results (which are provided in Figure 11) 
from analyzing the data gathered during Study 2 showed that, all six teams found additional 
faults during the re- inspection using abstracted error information, but the number of additional 
faults found was not higher than the number of faults found during fault-checklist based 
inspection (this maybe because most of the faults were already found during first inspection). 
But overall, all teams located new faults that were not located during fault-checklist inspection, 
thereby improving quality of their requirements.   
Results from Study 1 and Study 2 show that the Human Error Taxonomy helped improve 
the fault detection effectiveness of inspectors when compared to the existing techniques 
(Requirement Error Taxonomy and Fault-checklist based inspection techniques). 
4.3.2. RQ2: Does the Human Error Taxonomy Provide a Useful Method of Describing and 
Classifying the Human Errors and Faults Made During Development of a Software 
Requirements Specification document?  
This research question was further broken down into two research questions: 
 
Figure 11. Study 2: Number of New Faults Found During Error-based Reinspection 
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• RQ2a: Are all three Error types (slips, lapses, mistakes) and all error classes of the 
Human Error Taxonomy relevant to the requirements engineering process?  
• RQ2b: Do software developers believe that the Human Errors Taxonomy is useful 
for abstracting and classifying requirements engineering human errors? 
Data analysis and results for RQ2a is discussed in subsection 4.3.2.1 and the data analysis 
for RQ2b is discussed in subsection 4.3.2.2.   
4.3.2.1. RQ2a: Are all three Error types (slips, lapses, mistakes) and all error classes of the 
Human Error Taxonomy relevant to the requirements engineering process?  
Data gathered during Study 2 was analyzed in order to answer this research question. 
During Study 2, each team abstracted human errors from faults in their own requirements 
document (i.e., SRS document). The error abstraction data was analyzed at two levels: 
• Error Type Level: The high level error types of HET are slips, lapses, and 
mistakes. Analysis shown in Figure 12 indicates that all six teams made errors of 
the three types. That is, teams committed all three types of errors (slips, lapses, 
and mistakes) and these errors caused injection of faults in their SRS documents. 
• Error Class Level: Each high-level error type of HET has some low-level error 
classes. Error types Slip, Lapse, and Mistake have two, two, and eleven classes, 
respectively. Thus, there are a total of 15 low-level error classes in HET. 
Analysis showed that eleven of the fifteen error classes were represented in the 
SRS documents of the teams. That is, teams made faults that were classified into 
most (but not all fifteen) of HET’s error classes.  
Overall, this analysis indicates that all three error types (slips, lapses, mistakes) in the 
HET are important and relevant because software developers made errors and faults of each type. 
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Results also showed that developers made faults that were abstracted to (or traced back to) errors 
belonging to eleven of the fifteen error classes in HET. Hence, HET’s errors classes are also 
relevant to requirements engineering process, but need to be further studied so that more 
conclusions can be drawn about relevance of all fifteen classes.  
4.3.2.2. RQ3: Do software developers believe that the Human Errors Taxonomy is useful for 
abstracting and classifying requirements engineering human errors? 
The data gathered from Study 1, Study 2, and Study 3 was analyzed to answer this 
research question. First during Study 1 (the control group study), a post-study survey was 
conducted. In the survey, the experimental group and the control group participants rated HET 
(experimental group) and Requirement Error Taxonomy or RET (control group) across various 
usefulness categories on a 5-point scale (ranging from “1 – not useful” to “5 – very useful”). A 
focus group discussion was also conducted in order to understand the problems faced by 
participants while using HET/RET to find faults. Only the feedback data collected from the post-
study survey was analyzed to answer this research question (RQ3). The results (Table 16) 
showed that while both error taxonomies were rated favorably, HET received slightly better 
feedback in four out of the five usefulness categories. These four categories were usability (ease 
of use), usefulness, confidence that error classes in taxonomy represent real RE problems, and 
  
Figure 12. Study 2: Team Faults by Error Types 
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worthiness of effort spent in using the taxonomy. RET was rated more favorably for the 
category, “Error Classes Do Not Overlap”.  
This was expected because unlike the RET, the HET includes errors within an error type 
(e.g., Application error – an error class under Mistake) that can happen at different points during 
the requirements development process (i.e., elicitation, analysis, and verification). 
Table 16. Study 1: HET vs RET Comparison Using a 5-point Scale 
 HET RET 
Usability of the 
taxonomy 
2.9 2.6 
Error classes in 
the taxonomy are 
distinct and do 
not overlap 
2.9 3 
Usefulness of the 
taxonomy 
3.8 3.4 
Confidence that 
error classes in 
taxonomy 
represent real 
requirements 
engineering 
problems 
3.9 3.7 
Worthiness of 
effort 
3.3 3.2 
 
Next, during Study 2 (feasibility study), participants rated the Human Error Taxonomy 
(HET) across nine specific characteristics: usefulness, intuitiveness, confidence, understandable, 
classification, abstraction, helpful, and no overlap of error classes. Table 17 provides the results 
of this analysis. 
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Table 17. Study 2: Post-Study Survey Results 
HET 
Characteristic 
Survey Statement Mean Rating (on a 5-point 
Scale) 
Usefulness The HET is helpful for identifying 
faults 
3.4 
The HET is complete 3.7 
The HET will be useful on future 
project 
3.7 
The HET is helpful in improving the 
SRS 
4.2 
The HET is helpful to detect 
overlooked faults 
3.5 
The effort spent on using HET is 
valuable 
4 
Intuitiveness The HET is intuitive 3 
I am confident that errors represent 
real problem 
3.7 
Confidence I am confident in the error abstraction 
process 
2.9 
Understandability HET is easy to understand 3.4 
Classification The HET is easy to use to abstract 
and classify errors 
3 
Helpful The HET is helpful for understanding 
faults. 
3.8 
No overlap of 
errors classes 
HET’s error classes are distinct and 
do not overlap 
2.9 
 
Although, during Study 2, most of the HET-characteristics were rated positively, there 
were some characteristics that participants believed needed to be improved. Participants’ 
feedback showed that they did not find the HET intuitive and they also were not confident about 
the error abstraction process. Additionally, participant feedback also showed that they did not 
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find HET easy to use when abstracting and classifying human errors from requirements faults. 
Overall, feedback from Study 2 participants revealed that the error abstraction process and the 
error abstraction training was not clear and needed to be improved. 
Table 18. Study 3: Participants’ Feedback about Educational Value of HET 
Questions that evaluated effectiveness of HET and the error abstraction process for 
imparting knowledge of human errors 
 N Mean (SD) Median 
Q1 I feel confident I can distinguish between a 
slip and a lapse 
33 3.9 (0.6) 4 
Q2 I feel confident I can distinguish between a 
slip and a mistake 
33 4.1 (0.8) 4 
Q3 HET documentation had sufficient detail to 
allow me to understand human errors that 
occur during the requirements development 
process 
33 3.8 (1) 4 
Questions related to educational value of human errors and the error abstraction process 
Q4 The effort spent in learning human errors is 
valuable and worthwhile in understanding 
faults in requirements document. 
33 3.97 (0.9) 4 
Q5 I am confident that human errors represent 
real problems in the requirements 
development process. 
33 4.2 (0.8) 4 
              
Study 3 specifically focused on the educational value of training students on the 
requirements engineering human errors described in the HET. During Study 3, the students were 
first trained on HET and the error abstraction process and then they were asked to abstract errors 
from 10 faults in an externally developed SRS document (PGCS SRS). Next, students were 
asked to provide feedback about, whether performing the error abstraction process (using HET) 
has helped them in understanding the difference between the three human error types (slips, 
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lapses, mistakes). With Study 3, the central idea was to evaluate if HET is a good learning 
resource for Computer Science and Software Engineering students to learn about Cognitive 
Psychology concepts (i.e., slips, lapses, mistakes). Table 18 provides the results of analyzing the 
feedback data collected during Study 3. As can be seen in Table 18, students believed that 
performing error abstractions (using HET) from faults helped them learn about slips, lapses, and 
mistakes in general and also the slips, lapses, and mistakes that occur during the requirements 
engineering process. 
4.4. Summary of Results Obtained from the Three Studies 
The three studies described in this chapter were designed to evaluate the feasibility of 
using the Human Error Taxonomy for requirements fault detection. The results from Studies 1 
and 2 (shown in Figure 9, 10, and 11) showed that software developers were able to use human 
error information to find faults in requirements documents. The results (Figure 9 and 11) also 
showed that HET can provide improved fault detection effectiveness when compared to 
traditional inspection approaches like Requirements Error Taxonomy and Fault-checklist based 
inspections. The improvements, however, were not statistically significant. That is, during 
Studies 1 and 2, even though the inspectors who used HET found more faults, the HET did not 
help inspectors detect a significantly larger number of faults when compared to Requirements 
Error Taxonomy and Fault-checklist based inspections. Significance of results notwithstanding, 
the improved fault detection effectiveness provided by HET motivated further investigation of 
using the HET to support requirements inspections. 
The post-study surveys and discussions conducted during the studies also revealed that 
study participants faced major difficulties when performing error abstraction from requirements 
faults. Error abstraction is an important leg of the HET-based inspection approach (called Error 
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Abstraction and Inspection or EAI). These results revealed that in order to improve the fault 
detection effectiveness of the HET-based inspection approach (i.e., the EAI approach), it is 
important to improve the training and tool support for the error abstraction leg of EAI.  
To that end, I worked on developing an error abstraction tool called Human Error 
Abstraction Assist. The development of this tool was done under the supervision of a Cognitive 
Psychology expert, Dr. Gary Bradshaw (Professor, Mississippi State University). The next 
chapter provides a detailed description of the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) tool.         
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5.  THE HUMAR ERROR ABSTRACTION ASSIST TOOL 
EAI, which is the human error based (i.e., HET-based) inspection approach, begins with a 
fault checklist (FC) inspection step, which is followed by an error abstraction step, which in turn 
is followed by an error-informed re-inspection step. Results from Studies 1 and 2 (in Chapter 4) 
showed that, in order for improving the fault detection effectiveness of the HET-based inspection 
approach (Error Abstraction and Inspection or EAI approach), it was important that the error 
abstraction leg of EAI be improved. The error abstraction leg of EAI helps software development 
teams in identifying and understanding the human errors that were committed during the 
development process of a requirements document (these human errors in turn caused faults to be 
injected in the requirements document being inspected).  Participants of the studies described in 
Chapter 4 stated in their feedback that the trainings and support they were provided on error 
abstraction were not sufficient for them to be able to accurately abstract errors from requirements 
faults. Participants faced considerable difficulties during the error abstraction step. This maybe 
because the error abstraction step requires inspectors to retrospectively analyze each fault (found 
during the fault-checklist inspection) to determine the cognitive process that went awry (or was 
flawed to begin with), thus causing the fault to be injected. Requirements development is a fuzzy 
process as it involves multiple activities (elicitation, analysis, documentation etc.) and multiple 
people (client, end-users, requirement analysts, requirement author). Hence, for an inspector, 
who may not have not been involved in the requirements development process, retrospectively 
analyzing a fault to determine the cognitive failure (human error) that caused the injection of the 
fault can be an overwhelming and complex task. Overwhelming, because the inspector can think 
of numerous scenarios where the cognitive failure might have occurred and this can cause 
difficulties for the inspector to pick the most likely scenario. 
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Table 19. Distribution of HET’s Human Errors across RE Activities  
             RE Activities                               
 
Human Error 
Categories 
Elicitation Analysis Specification Management 
Slips 
Clerical Errors   Clerical Errors   
    
Lack of consistency 
in Requirement 
Specifications   
Lapses 
Loss of information from 
stakeholders       
Accidentally overlooking 
requirements       
 
 
 
 
 
Mistakes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Application errors Application errors     
Environment errors Environment errors Environment errors   
      
Information 
Management 
errors 
Wrong assumptions Wrong assumptions     
Low understanding of each 
other’s roles 
Low understanding of 
each other’s roles     
Mistaken belief that it is 
impossible to specify non-
functional requirements in a 
verifiable form 
Mistaken belief that it is 
impossible to specify non-
functional requirements in 
a verifiable form     
Not having a clear 
demarcation between client 
and users       
Lack of awareness of 
sources of requirements       
  Problem-Solution errors     
      
Inadequate 
Requirements 
Process 
    Syntactic errors   
 
To alleviate this problem and assist the inspectors when they are trying to identify the 
human error that caused the injection of a fault, an intuitive questionnaire-style framework 
(Appendix B) was developed that helps inspectors accurately pinpoint the human error that 
caused the fault being analyzed. The Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) works by guiding 
the inspector in eliminating the unlikely scenarios and focus on a scenario that is more likely to 
have caused the injection of the fault being analyzed.  
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The motivation behind HEAA’s development was the belief that inspectors will be more 
comfortable if they focus their attention on requirements phase activities (elicitation, analysis, 
specification, and management) instead of focusing on understanding the mechanisms of human 
cognitive failures (i.e., slips, lapses, and mistakes). This is because inspectors are generally 
software developers and are expected to have more knowledge about the various requirements 
engineering activities as compared to being knowledgeable about slips, lapses, and mistakes. 
Therefore, for developing the HEAA, the fifteen human error classes in the Human Error 
Taxonomy were distributed across four major requirements engineering activities (elicitation, 
analysis, specification, and management). Table 19 on the pervious page provides the result of 
this distribution. The HEAA was developed based on this distribution of errors. A description of 
how the HEAA helps inspectors in mapping requirements faults to human errors is provided in 
subsection 5.1. 
5.1. Error Abstraction Using HEAA  
Abstracting human error from a given fault with HEAA begins with the inspector picking 
a requirements phase activity wherein the human error occurred and resulted in the injection of 
 
Figure 13. Question# 1 in Human Error Abstraction Assist 
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the fault being analyzed. As Question #1 in HEAA (see Figure 13), a checklist of items is 
provided to guide the selection of the requirements activity.  
The next question (Question# 2) requires the inspector to visualize and provide an 
account of the scenario where the human error occurred. This helps the inspectors in improving 
their understanding of the requirement phase activity where the human error might have occurred 
(so in a sense, steps 1 and 2 are iterative in nature).  
Next, as Question# 3, the inspector picks a human error from the options provided to 
him/her under error boxes labelled with requirement activity names.  
Each box in Question # 3 (see Figure 14) is labeled with a particular requirements 
engineering activity and provides the human errors that are relevant to that requirements 
engineering activity. The boxes in Question# 3 of the HEAA tool were created based on the 
 
Figure 14. Question# 3 in Human Error Abstraction Assist 
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distribution of human errors across requirements engineering activities (this distribution was 
shown in Table 19).  
5.2. Evaluation of the Usefulness of HEAA Tool 
The Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) tool was created with the purpose of 
improving the error abstraction leg of the human error-based requirements inspection approach, 
Error Abstraction and Inspection (or EAI) approach. After the creation of the HEAA tool, 
empirical studies were conducted to evaluate whether the HEAA tool provides improved support 
(compared to Human Error Taxonomy) for software developers when they are trying to abstract 
human errors from requirements faults. It was anticipated that improved support during the error 
abstraction leg of EAI would improve the fault detection effectiveness of the EAI inspection 
approach. To that end, Chapter 6 described the controlled studies conducted to evaluate the 
usefulness of the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool during human error-based requirements 
inspections. 
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6. VALIDATION AND REFINEMENT OF THE HUMAN ERROR ABSTRACTION 
ASSIST TOOL        
The creation of the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) tool was motivated by 
participant feedback that training and support for the error abstraction leg of the human error-
based inspection approach (i.e., the Error Abstraction and Inspection or EAI approach) needed to 
be improved. After the creation of the HEAA tool, four empirical studies were designed and 
executed to evaluate its usefulness. The studies not only evaluated the usefulness of the HEAA 
tool during human error-based requirements inspections, but also evaluated the human error-
based requirements inspection approach (i.e., the EAI approach) itself. Essentially, the four 
studies were a continuation of the series of studies (described in Chapter 4) to evaluate the 
usefulness of the human errors identified in Human Error Taxonomy, with the only exception 
being that the EAI inspection approach was now being supported by the newly developed HEAA 
tool. Because the four new studies are continuation in the series of empirical evaluations of 
human error-based requirements inspections, the four new studies are referred to as Studies 4, 5, 
6, and 7 (the first three studies of the series were described in Chapter 4). 
This chapter describes the procedure followed and the results obtained from the four 
empirical studies that were conducted after the creation of the HEAA tool. Section 6.1 provides 
the research questions that drove the designs of the four studies, followed by Section 6.2 that 
provides the study designs for the four studies. Section 6.3 provides the results obtained from the 
four studies. 
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6.1. Research Questions 
Table 20 provides the research questions that were formulated to enable data collection 
for evaluating the usefulness of the human error-based requirements inspection approach (i.e., 
EAI approach) supported by the newly developed Human Error Abstraction Assist tool. 
Table 20. Research Questions to Evaluate the Usefulness of the EAI approach when supported 
by the HEAA tool 
# Research Question 
RQ1 Can the Error Abstraction and Inspection approach (supported by the Human Error 
Abstraction Assist tool) improve the fault detection effectiveness of inspectors when 
compared to traditional requirements inspection approach? 
RQ2 Does the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool provide a useful method for abstracting 
human errors from requirements faults? 
RQ3 Can error abstraction using the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool provide 
significant insights into the type of human errors that are committed most frequently 
during the requirements development process?  
 
6.2. Description of Designs of the Four Empirical Studies 
This section provides the designs of the four controlled studies that provided data for 
answering the research questions described in Table 20. This section provides the designs of the 
four studies, followed by Chapter 6.3 that provides the data analysis and results (based on the 
research questions shown in Table 20). As the four studies described in this chapter are 
continuation of the series of empirical evaluations (described in Chapter 4) of the usefulness of 
human error-based requirements inspections, the four studies are titled Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
6.2.1. Experiment Design for Study 4 
The primary goal of Study 4 was to evaluate if the Error Abstraction and Inspection 
(EAI) approach supported by the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool will help inspectors 
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discover a significantly larger number of faults that are otherwise left undetected when using the 
standard fault checklist-based inspection approach. 
The participants in Study 4 were 17 graduate students enrolled in the Software 
Requirements Definition and Analysis course at North Dakota State University. The participants 
were a mix of MS and PhD students in computer science or software engineering and had prior 
Information Technology (IT) industry experience. The course trained students on identifying, 
analyzing, documenting and verifying requirements. 
Study 4 utilized two different requirements artifacts. During the initial training, 
participants performed a practice inspection using EAI on a software requirements specification 
(SRS) document that specified requirements for a Parking Garage Control System (PGCS). 
PGCS SRS described requirements for controlling the entries and exits of a parking garage. The 
PGCS SRS was 10 pages long and seeded by its original developers with 30 realistic faults. 
PGCS SRS was chosen for the training due to its generic domain and seeded set of faults. For the 
transfer session, participants used EAI to inspect the SRS document for Restaurant Interactive 
Menu (RIM) system. The RIM system is responsible for taking customer’s orders in a restaurant 
with the help of an interactive PDA or online system. The RIM SRS was developed for a real 
project through interaction with clients, was 21 pages long, and contained real faults. 
Figure 15 shows the experimental procedure followed during Study 4. The study was 
conducted in two phases: an initial training and the transfer session. The initial training consisted 
of two training sessions: Training 1 on fault checklist (FC) inspection approach, and Training 2 
on EAI approach. Transfer session refers to the part of the experiment wherein participants apply 
(or transfer) the knowledge gained during the trainings to carry out the actual experimental tasks. 
The details of the trainings and transfer session steps are provided in Table 21. 
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6.2.2. Improving the Human Error Abstraction Assist Tool 
Using lessons learned from the previous study (i.e., Study 4), I first worked on 
refining/improving the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) tool, and next Study 5 was 
conducted wherein the Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach was supported by the 
refined-HEAA tool. Before describing the experiment design of Study 5, in this section a brief 
description of the improvements added to the HEAA tool is provided. 
The goal was to improve the HEAA tool on several levels. First goal was to refine the 
HEAA to help the inspectors better visualize the situation/scenario wherein the human error 
occurred and led to the injection of the fault that is being analyzed. Second goal was to provide 
inspectors with a better view of HET’s three human error types (slips, lapses, mistakes). 
 
 
Figure 15. Study 4: Experimental Procedure 
 57 
Table 21. Study 4: Steps Performed by Participants 
Experimental Step Description 
Training 1 – Pre-experimental training on 
Fault-Checklist (FC) inspection. 
Over the course of the semester, the participants have been trained on applying the fault-
checklist (FC) approach on various SRS documents. Training 1 consisted of a quick recap 
session of the FC inspection approach. 
Training 2 
(PGCS SRS) 
Initial training on EAI This training was a 90-minute training session wherein the participants were trained on human 
error taxonomy (HET), on using the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) to abstract and 
classify human errors, and on using the abstracted human errors to find additional faults in the 
SRS document. After the participants were introduced to HET and HEAA, they were provided 
with the PGCS SRS and 6 (out of 30 seeded) randomly chosen faults. 
Step 1 –  Error 
abstraction and 
classification on the 6 
faults 
The participants used information provided during initial training (on EAI) to abstract and 
classify human errors from the six faults using Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA). The 
output of this step was 17 individual Error Report Forms (one per participant) containing human 
errors present in PGCS SRS. 
Step 2 – Error-informed 
re-inspection of PGCS 
SRS for the remaining 
faults 
The participants then re-inspected the PGCS SRS using the human error information contained 
in error report form (from Step 1). The output of this step was 17 individual New-Fault lists (one 
per participant) containing new faults found during the re-inspection. 
Following the completion of Step 2, the researchers discussed the issues faced by the 
participants when performing error abstraction, and re-inspection using the EAI process. 
Transfer 
Session (RIM 
SRS) 
Step 1 – FC Based 
inspection 
The participants used the fault-checklist (FC) inspection approach to inspect the RIM SRS. This 
step resulted in 17 individual Fault forms (one per participant) containing faults present in RIM 
SRS. 
Step 2 – Human error 
abstraction and 
classification 
Participants used the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) to abstract and classify human 
errors for each fault they found during Step 1. The result of this step was 17 individual Error 
Report forms containing human errors committed during the development of RIM SRS. 
Step 3 – Error-informed 
re-inspection of RIM 
SRS for remaining 
faults 
The participants re-inspected RIM SRS using the human error information from Error Report 
forms (from Step 2). The output of this step was 17 individual New-Fault List forms containing 
new faults in RIM SRS (i.e., faults that were not found during FC inspection or Step 1). 
Post Study Questionnaire After completing the steps described above, participants provided feedback regarding the 
usefulness of EAI, HEAA and the training procedures. This feedback was required in order to 
better understand the results and make improvements in both the EAI and the HEAA tool. 
 
In order to achieve these goals, a decision flow diagram (Figure 16) was added to the 
HEAA tool in consultation with the Psychology expert. The improved HEAA tool can be found 
in Appendix C. The decision flow diagram asks intuitive questions at the decision nodes, which 
helps the inspectors in selecting the right human error type for the fault they are analyzing.  
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A noticeable change in the improved HEAA compared to the one used in Study 4 (see 
Chapter 5 for a description of the HEAA tool used in Study 4) is that the high level error types of 
HET (i.e., slips, lapses, mistakes) have been brought back into the fold. That is, the improved 
HEAA will require inspectors to choose an appropriate error type (slips/lapse/mistake) before 
they select a human error class. The inclusion of error type level in HEAA was suggested by the 
Cognitive Psychology expert (Dr. Gary Bradshaw). The rationale is that, from an inspector’s 
perspective, an understanding of slips, lapses, and mistakes will promote his/her understanding 
of the detailed human error classes that are included in the HET. Concerning the above-
mentioned inclusion of the error type level in HEAA, an additional module to the error 
abstraction training has been added. The additional module focuses on helping inspectors 
understand the difference between slips, lapses, and mistakes by demonstrating the process of 
mapping simple real world mishaps to slips, lapses, and mistakes. It will be demonstrated to the 
inspectors that the decision tree (Figure 16) can be used to categorize day-to-day accidents or 
 
Figure 16. Decision Tree to Select Error Type 
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mishaps (such as clinical misdiagnosis by a doctor) as either a slip, lapse, or a mistake. Such 
examples are expected to help inspectors in understanding and using the refined HEAA tool (to 
map requirements faults to human errors) more effectively.        
Furthermore, in order to improve the error abstraction training, more examples of the 
“fault to error-class mapping process” were needed. In order to do this, the training was updated 
to include demonstrations of the steps of error abstraction (using HEAA) for real faults in the 
RIM SRS. That is, for a selected set of RIM SRS faults, the training will include all steps, 
starting from situation/scenario formation, to error type selection (using decision flow diagram), 
to error-class selection. 
Study 5, which is described in the next section, evaluated the EAI inspection approach 
supported by the refined-HEAA tool.        
6.2.3. Experiment Design for Study 5 
Similar to Study 4, the main goal of Study 5 was to evaluate if the Error Abstraction and 
Inspection (EAI) approach supported by the HEAA tool can help inspectors identify 
requirements faults that are overlooked or are hard-to-locate during traditional requirements 
inspections. One major difference between Study 4 and Study 5 was that Study 5 used the 
refined HEAA tool. Another primary goal of Study 5 was to gather and analyze data about: (1) 
issues that inspectors face when abstracting human errors from requirements faults and, (2) 
strategies that inspectors use when using the abstracted human error information to locate 
additional related faults. 
Fifteen (15) Graduate students enrolled in the Software Development Processes course at 
North Dakota State University (NDSU) participated in Study 5. The course is a breadth course 
on software engineering topics and covers the entire software development lifecycle.  
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An artifact that described the requirements for a Restaurant Interactive Menu (RIM) 
system and contained naturally occurring faults was used during the study. The RIM system 
allows restaurant owners to control the inventory, and restaurant customers to order and pay 
bills. RIM SRS was used during Study 5 to enable comparison of the results with Study 4 (Study 
4 also used RIM and evaluated the usefulness of the EAI inspection approach, but in Study 5 
EAI was supported by the refined-HEAA). 
The experimental procedure was carefully designed to gather insights that can be used to 
improve the Error Abstraction (EA) and the error-informed re-inspection steps of the EAI 
approach. Table 22 provides the descriptions of the procedure followed during Study 5. 
Table 22. Study 5: Steps Performed by Participants 
Experimental Step Description 
Training 1 During this 50-minute session, participants were trained on human errors in the Human Error Taxonomy, 
abstracting human errors from requirements faults using the refined-HEAA.  
Step 1- Error Abstraction 
from RIM SRS faults  
Participants were supplied with the RIM SRS and 16 known faults in the RIM SRS and were asked to 
abstract human errors from the 16 given faults. The output of this step was 15 error report forms (one per 
participant) containing human errors in RIM SRS. The output of this step helped in comparing the error 
abstraction results of all participants on same set of faults.   
Step 2 – Error-informed 
inspection of RIM SRS  
Participants were given the expected error abstraction results for each of the 16 faults. The expected 
abstraction results were decided in consultation with a Cognitive Psychologist, Dr. Gary Bradshaw. The 
participants were asked to use the provided human error information to inspect RIM SRS and locate 
additional faults related to the provided human errors. The idea behind giving participants the expected 
error abstraction results for each of the 16 given faults was to understand how individual participants use 
the same human error information to find additional related faults. The outcome of this step was 15 
individual Fault Report Forms containing new faults in RIM SRS.  The motivation behind asking 
participants to perform this task (i.e., error-informed inspection) was to evaluate if human error information 
helps inspectors in identifying additional faults (that are overlooked when only the traditional fault-
checklist inspection approach is used). 
 
6.2.4. Experiment Design for Study 6 (Live Study in a Conference) 
Studies 5 and 6 were performed simultaneously, and while Study 5 evaluated the refined-
HEAA tool in academic settings, Study 6 was targeted towards requirements engineering 
practitioners and researchers. Study 6 was performed at a requirements engineering (RE) 
conference called Requirements Engineering: Foundations for Software Quality (REFSQ) [48]. 
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The major goal of Study 6 was to evaluate if requirements engineering professionals are 
able to use the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool to abstract human errors from requirements 
faults. The population of interest were professionals with understanding of requirements 
engineering activities and industry experience. Participants were recruited at the venue of the 
conference (REFSQ conference). A total of 15 conference attendees volunteered to participate in 
Study 6. Although any background information regarding participants’ experience was not 
gathered, the participants were a good mix of academic requirements engineering researchers 
(university professors) and industry practitioners (in software development organizations across 
world). 
The requirements document used during the study was the document that specified 
requirements for a Parking Garage Control System (PGCS). Due to time restriction, instead of 
asking participants to read the entire PGCS requirements document, an error report form was 
prepared that provided background information and fault descriptions of 10 randomly selected 
faults in the PGCS requirements document. The participants were asked to abstract human errors 
from the 10 faults provided to them. The following supplementary documents were provided 
during the study: 
 
Figure 17. Sample Error Report Form 
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• PGCS SRS: A printed copy of PGCS requirements document in case if 
participants wanted more background information related to the fault being 
analyzed. 
• Refined-HEAA decision tree: A printed copy of the refined-HEAA tool was 
provided to help participants in abstracting human errors from the 10 given faults. 
• Error Report Form: The error report form contained 10 faults in PGCS SRS. 
Participants were asked to abstract errors from the faults after they were provided 
a training on how to use the HEAA tool. Figure 17 provides the error reporting 
template for one of the 10 PGCS faults. Note that the participants used the HEAA 
tool to abstract only the requirements engineering activity and the error type 
(slip/lapse/mistake) for each fault. Due to time constraints, the participants were 
not asked to abstract the human error class for the faults.      
Table 23 provides the procedure followed during Study 6. 
Table 23. Study 6: Steps Performed by Participants 
Experimental 
Step 
Description 
Error Abstraction 
Training 
During a 30-minute session, participants were trained on the human 
error classes in Human Error Taxonomy, and how to use the refined-
HEAA tool to abstract errors from the given faults. 
Step 2 - Error 
abstraction and 
classification 
Participants used the HEAA tool to abstract and classify human errors 
(into Slips, Lapses, and Mistakes) from 10 given faults in PGCS SRS. 
Step 3 - 
Discussion of 
Results 
The completion of error abstraction step was followed by a discussion 
of participants’ results. The discussion step helped in gaining insights 
into the thought process of participants when they were analyzing faults 
and tracing the faults to human errors. 
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6.2.5. Experiment Design for Study 7 
The primary goal of Study 7 was to evaluate the usefulness of Human Error Abstraction 
Assist (HEAA) in helping software developers in understanding/ identifying the human errors 
committed during the requirements engineering process. During Study 7, the objective was to 
evaluate the usefulness of HEAA for two distinct situations: 
• Usefulness of the HEAA when identifying the human errors that were committed 
during the creation process of an externally-developed requirements document 
(note that the human errors, in this case, were committed by someone else). 
• Usefulness of the HEAA when identifying the human errors that were committed 
during the creation process of a self-developed requirements document. 
Essentially, the idea was to evaluate whether HEAA can be used by software 
developers to map the faults (in their own requirements documents) to human 
errors that caused the injection of the faults. 
Compared to the error abstraction training in Study 6, a small improvement was made to 
the error abstraction training during Study 7. A training supplement that provides the fault to 
error-class mappings for all the faults in PGCS SRS has been made available for helping 
inspectors in understanding the error abstraction process better. This training supplement was 
used during Study 7 during the Reflection step (shown in Figure 18 and described in Table 24).  
Thirty-six (36) undergraduate computer science students enrolled in the Principles of 
Software Engineering course at North Dakota State University participated in this study. The 
course required students to work in teams to develop Software Requirements Specifications 
(SRS) for different software systems. After developing the SRS, the teams proceeded to 
implement the requirements. In this study, the focus was specifically on the faults and errors 
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committed during the requirements (i.e., SRS) creation process. The students were divided into 
teams by the course instructor prior to this study. 
Table 24. Study 7: Steps Performed by Participants 
Experimental Step Description 
SRS Creation The participants worked as part of teams to create requirements documents for different software systems. A description of 
the different software systems for which the teams created requirements documents, is provided in Appendix D. Note that 
teams had already created their requirement documents (i.e., their SRS’s) before the study started.  
Training 1 – Error 
Abstraction Training 
During a 50-minute session, participants were trained on Human Error Taxonomy (HET), and on using the HEAA tool to 
abstract errors from faults. In order to demonstrate the HEAA tool’s step-by-step procedure of mapping requirements faults 
to human errors, some generic requirements faults were used. 
Task 1 – Abstraction and 
Classification of Human 
Errors in PGCS SRS 
After the error abstraction training, participants were supplied with PGCS SRS, and 15 faults in the PGCS SRS. The 
participants were asked to use HEAA in order to map each of the 15 faults to human error that caused the fault. The outcome 
of this step was 36 individual error report forms (one per participant) containing human errors present in PGCS SRS. 
Reflection In this step, the participants were provided the expected error abstraction results for each of the 15 PGCS faults. The expected 
error abstraction results were obtained through discussions with a Cognitive Psychology expert (Dr. Bradshaw). The idea 
behind reflection step was to improve participants’ understanding of the fault-to-error mapping process (i.e., the error 
abstraction process using HEAA). 
Training 2 – Training on 
Fault-checklist Inspection 
Technique 
The participants were trained on how to use the fault-checklist inspection technique to inspect SRS documents. This step is 
required to identify faults in a requirements document. The identified faults can then be mapped to human errors. So, 
essentially this step is required to initiate the error discovery process. 
Task 2 – Fault-checklist 
Inspection of Self-created 
SRS 
Participants inspected their self-developed SRS documents during this step. Each participant inspected the document they had 
created as part of their team. So, a participant who was part of Team 1 (see Appendix D) and created the SRS document for 
Dissertation Calculator system inspected the Dissertation Calculator SRS. The output of this task was 36 individual Fault 
Report Forms containing faults in different SRS documents created by the teams. 
Fault Consolidation This was performed by the researchers. As an example, for Team 1, I first compiled all the faults reported by the 8 team 
members. Next, I removed any false-positives (i.e., non-faults) and created a Master Fault List that only consisted of actual 
faults (true-positives) in Team 1’s SRS. This was done for all 5 teams. 
Task 3 - Abstraction and 
Classification of Human 
Errors in Self-created SRS 
Participants were provided with the Master Fault List that was created for their SRS document (in previous step) and asked 
to individually abstract human errors (using HEAA) for each fault in their self-developed SRS’s Master Fault List. The 
outcome of this step was 36 individual Error Report Forms containing human errors in the SRS documents created by the 
participants. 
 
 
Figure 18. Study 7: Experimental Procedure 
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Study 7’s objective was to evaluate the usefulness of HEAA, both when abstracting 
errors from faults in an externally-developed SRS and when abstracting faults in a self-developed 
SRS. Therefore, the study was conducted across two phases (see Figure 18). During Phase 1, an 
externally developed SRS that specified requirements for a Parking Garage Control System 
(PGCS) was used. During Phase 2 (see Figure 18) of the study, participants abstracted human 
errors from faults in the SRS documents that they had developed (as part of a team) during the 
course of the semester. Appendix D provides a description of the systems for which SRS’s were 
created by each team. Table 24 provides the steps performed by the participants during Study 7. 
6.3. Analysis of Data Gathered During Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7 
This section provides the results of analyzing the data gathered during Studies 4, 5, 6, and 
7. This section is organized around the three Research Questions (shown in Table 20, Section 
6.1) that were formulated to validate the usefulness of the Error Abstraction and Inspection 
(EAI) approach supported by the Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA) tool. The four studies 
(Studies 4, 5, 6 and 7) were designed with the goal of collecting the data to answer the three 
Research Questions described in Table 20. Experimental design for each of the four studies were 
provided in Sections 6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4 and 6.2.5, respectively. 
6.3.1. RQ1: Can the Error Abstraction and Inspection Approach (supported by the Human 
Error Abstraction Assist Tool) Improve the Fault Detection Effectiveness of Inspectors 
when Compared to Traditional Requirements Inspection Approach? 
Data gathered during Studies 4 and 5 was analyzed to answer this research question. 
During Study 4, participants first detected faults in a requirements document (RIM SRS) 
using the fault-checklist inspection technique. Next, they used the HEAA tool to abstract human 
errors from the faults they had found during the fault-checklist inspection. Finally, the 
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participants performed an error-informed reinspection on the RIM SRS. It was found that during 
the fault-checklist inspection of RIM SRS, participants found an average of 6 faults. Whereas, 
during the error-informed reinspection of RIM SRS, participants were able to locate an average 
of 14 new faults that they were not able to find during the first inspection (i.e., the fault-checklist 
inspection). Figure 19 shows the result of this analysis. Figure 19 compares the fault count of 
each participant during fault-checklist inspection (bottom portion of each column) vs. the new 
fault count during re-inspection using EAI (top portion of the same column). For example, 
participant S1 (inspector# 1) found 3 faults during the first inspection (using fault-checklist), and 
found 7 new faults during the re-inspection (using EAI), which computes to a percentage 
increase of 233% in fault detection effectiveness. Overall, participants found an average of 6 
faults during the first inspection (fault-checklist) and an average of 14 new faults during the 
second inspection (EAI), with an average increase in effectiveness of 225%. These results 
provide evidence that an error-abstraction and inspection (EAI), supported by HEAA, can help 
inspectors discover a significantly more number of faults in an SRS that are otherwise left 
 
Figure 19. Study 4: Effectiveness of EAI vs. Fault-checklist inspection 
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undetected during the fault-checklist based inspection. The result of the one-sample test 
(p<0.001) showed that the average number of faults found using EAI (14) was significantly 
higher than average number of faults during FC inspection (6). Furthermore, even though the 
participants were re-inspecting the same document during EAI-based reinspection, the 
significantly large number of additional faults found shows that EAI is a very useful addition to 
FC for improving requirements quality. 
During Study 5, participants were given 16 faults in the RIM SRS document and were 
asked to use the HEAA tool to abstract errors from the given faults. Next, the participants were 
provided with human errors that caused the injection of each of the 16 faults (for reflection 
purpose). The participants then used human error information to inspect the RIM SRS document. 
As shown in Figure 20, all participants were able to use human error information to find at least 
some new faults in RIM SRS (the new faults were not part of the list of 16 faults given to them). 
On an average, participants in Study 5 found 11.4 new faults in RIM SRS. A one-sample t-test 
showed the mean number of faults found by participants using error information was 
significantly larger than zero (p<0.001). 
 
Figure 20. Study 5: Number of New faults Found During Error-informed Inspection 
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The analyses from Studies 4 and 5 shown above (in Figures 19 and 20, respectively) 
provide evidence that the Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach when supported by 
the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool can improve the fault detection effectiveness of 
inspectors when used in conjunction with the traditional fault-checklist inspection approach. 
Another analysis - related to gathering insights about what strategies are used by 
inspectors during the error informed reinspection step of EAI approach - was performed on data 
collected during Study 5. During Study 5, participants were provided with 16 faults in RIM SRS 
documents and they were also provided with the human errors that caused the injection of the 
given 16 faults. The participants were then asked to use the error information to find related 
faults in RIM SRS. The idea behind supplying all participants with the error information was to 
examine: When provided with the correct human error (that caused a fault), where in the SRS 
document do participants look in order to find other related faults that were caused by the 
human error? 
An interpretive analysis (see Table 25) was performed on the fault data provided by 
participants during the error-informed inspection of RIM SRS (during Study 5).  
The goal of this interpretive analysis was to obtain insights into how participants make 
use of error-information to find additional faults that are related to the errors. Currently, the 
error-informed inspection is an ad-hoc process, wherein individual inspectors devise their own 
strategies to locate new faults.  
We examined the location of all the new faults reported by the participants (not just the 
true-positives) for each of the 16 fault-error combinations provided to them. 
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Table 25. Study 5: Strategies Used by Inspectors during Error-informed Reinspection 
Strategy Title Strategy Description Example 
Additional 
faults in the 
same 
requirement 
Participants reviewed the requirement that 
contained the original fault when looking 
for additional faults. The rationale was that 
the same requirement may contain more 
faults (not necessarily similar to original 
fault) because the requirements engineer/s 
who worked on creating the requirement 
were already under the influence of the 
human error (that was abstracted from the 
given original fault)  
As an example, for Fault #1, the error happened 
while specifying the requirement titled, 
‘RIM_CUSTLOGIN_S01’. This requirement can 
be found between lines Line 77 to 124 in the RIM 
SRS. Multiple participants used this strategy to 
report other faults in the same requirement. 
Furthermore, three participants successfully 
found a new fault (true-positive) on Line #105.  
Additional 
similar faults 
in other 
similar 
requirements 
Participants reviewed the RIM SRS to first 
find any requirements that were similar to 
the requirement in which the original 
given fault was located. Next, if 
participants were able to identify any 
similar requirement, they reviewed the 
identified requirement to find faults that 
were similar to the original fault. The 
rationale was that if a human error 
occurred while creating a specific type of 
requirement, then it is possible that the 
same human error might have occurred 
while creating other similar requirements.        
As an example, Fault #2 is located in the 
requirement stated between lines 77-124, more 
specifically in the constraints section of the 
requirement. Fault #2 occurred due to 
carelessness while performing numerical 
calculations. Participants looked at constraints 
sections of other requirements, specifically where 
numerical calculations may have been performed 
by requirements engineer/s. Eleven (11) 
participants successfully used this strategy to find 
a similar calculation-related fault in a different 
requirement.     
Additional 
faults in 
related 
requirements 
The creators of RIM SRS have attached a 
related requirements section with every 
requirement. Participants reviewed 
requirements related to the original 
requirement (in which the original given 
fault was located). The rationale was that 
if a human error occurred during the 
creation of a requirement, then the human 
error might have affected the creation 
process of related requirements as well.    
As an example, Fault #3 is in a requirement 
titled, ‘RIM_REQUEST_HELP_S03’. Four 
participants reviewed a related requirement 
titled, ‘RIM_ORDER_ENTREE_D08’ and 
reported faults (found to be false-positives) in 
the latter requirement.  
Additional 
similar faults 
in other 
requirements 
For simplistic faults like ‘missing 
information or missing words’, 
participants just read through the whole 
SRS to find if there are other instances 
where requirement-sentences were 
missing or words in the sentence were 
missing (rendering the requirement 
incomplete or ambiguous).    
As an example, Fault #8 states that “Hacker is 
listed in the list of actors. However, the hacker 
has no role in this requirement”. Participants 
simply looked at the ‘Actor’ sub-section of all 
requirements to find if other requirements had 
faulty ‘Actor’ list. Four participants successfully 
found a fault on Line #346. The fault was that the 
‘Actor’ sub-section of the requirement was left 
blank (whereas all use cases must have at least 
one actor).   
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Please recall that, during Study 5, for each of the 16 RIM SRS faults that were provided 
to the participants, they were also provided the human error that caused the fault. This analysis 
necessitated interpretation because, for each original given fault, we needed to compare and 
contrast the location of the reported faults (which participants deemed to be related to the 
original fault) with the location of the original fault. Furthermore, we had no quantitative data 
about: why a participant thought that a certain reported fault was related to the original fault and 
human error (that was provided for the original fault). There was also no quantitative data about 
what prompted the participant to look for a related fault at a particular location. Therefore, we 
needed to derive meaningful interpretations (from the locations of the reported faults) about how 
a participant (or multiple participants) found the particular reported faults. In other words, we 
were looking for prompts that participants created in their mind when looking for new faults. 
This analysis revealed four major strategies (shown in Table 25) that participants used in order to 
locate new faults related to the given fault-error combinations. In the future evaluations of the 
EAI inspection approach, the inspectors will be trained on these reinspection strategies.   
6.3.2. RQ2: Does the Human Error Abstraction Assist Tool Provide a Useful Method for 
Abstracting Human Errors from Requirements Faults? 
This research question focused on the usefulness of HEAA tool. A major focus was to 
evaluate if using the HEAA tool to support the EAI inspection approach works better when 
compared to simply using the Human Error Taxonomy (HET) to support the EAI approach (HET 
was used to support EAI during the first set of evaluations that were discussed in Chapter 4). 
Another focus of this research question (RQ2) was to evaluate the 
refinements/improvements that were added to the HEAA tool using the lessons learned during 
the empirical studies. After its creation, the HEAA tool was first used during Study 4. After 
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Study 4, the HEAA was refined (see Section 6.2.2.) and the refined HEAA tool was used in the 
rest of the studies (Studies 5, 6, and 7). Hence, it was important to evaluate whether these 
refinements helped in improving the effectiveness of the HEAA tool.  
Based on the discussion above, it can be seen that Research Question 2 (RQ2) is a 
multipart research question. Hence, RQ2 has been subdivided into the following research 
questions: 
• RQ2a: Does the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool improve the error 
abstraction effectiveness of inspectors when compared to abstracting errors using 
Human Error Taxonomy? 
• RQ2b: What insights into – the problems faced by the inspectors during the 
process of error abstraction using HEAA tool – can be used to improve the error 
abstraction process? 
• RQ2c: Is the error abstraction process (supported by the HEAA tool) more 
effective when employed by professional requirements engineers as compared to 
when it is employed by students? 
• RQ2d: Is the error abstraction process (supported by the HEAA tool) more 
effective when employed on self-developed requirements documents as compared 
to when employed on externally-developed requirements documents?  
Data analyses and results for RQ2a, RQ2b, RQ2c, and RQ2d are discussed in subsections 
6.3.2.1. 6.3.2.2, 6.3.2.3, and 6.3.2.4, respectively. 
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6.3.2.1. RQ2a: Does the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool improve the error abstraction 
effectiveness of inspectors when compared to abstracting errors using Human Error 
Taxonomy? 
It is important to understand if the HEAA tool has improved the error abstraction process, 
which is an important step of the human error based requirements inspection approach (i.e., the 
Error Abstraction and Inspection or EAI approach). In order to measure the improvements 
provided by the HEAA tool, a metric called Error Abstraction Accuracy is used. Error 
abstraction accuracy is calculated for each inspector and it is simply the percentage of correctly 
abstracted errors out of the total number of errors reported by an inspector. As an example, if an 
inspector abstracted 16 human errors (from 16 requirements faults), and out of the 16 reported 
errors, 8 were correctly abstracted, then the Error Abstraction Accuracy for the inspector would 
be 50% (i.e., 8/16). 
To answer the research question (RQ2a), a comparison was made between the error 
abstraction accuracies achieved by participants of Study 1 vs the participants of Study 4. During 
Study 1, twenty-three participants from the experimental group used the Human Error Taxonomy 
to abstract errors from 10 faults in the PGCS SRS (details about Study 1 can be found in Section 
4.2.1). For all twenty-three Study 1 participants, the mean error abstraction accuracy (when 
abstracting and classifying human errors from the same 10 given PGCS SRS faults) was found to 
be 15.45%. That is, overall, the 23 participants were able to achieve an error abstraction accuracy 
of 15.45% (using the Human Error Taxonomy) when abstracting and classifying human errors 
from the 10 given PGCS SRS faults. 
Now, during the first phase of Study 4, participants were supplied with 6 faults in the 
PGCS SRS and were asked to abstract human errors from the faults. But, unlike Study 1 (in 
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which participants were trained on error abstraction using Human Error Taxonomy), during 
Study 4 participants were trained on error abstraction using the HEAA tool (more details about 
Study 4 can be found in 6.2.1). It was found that participants in Study 4 were able to achieve a 
mean error abstraction accuracy of 26.04%. Table 26 compares the error abstraction accuracy 
that was achieved using Human Error Taxonomy in Study 1 vs the error abstraction accuracy 
that was achieved using Human Error Abstraction Assist in Study 4. 
Table 26. Study 1 vs Study 4: Error Abstraction Accuracy Comparison 
Study Description Mean Error Abstraction Accuracy 
Study 1: 23 participants used the Human Error 
Taxonomy to abstract human errors from faults 
in PGCS SRS.   
15.45% 
Study 4: 17 participants used the Human Error 
Abstract Assist tool to abstract human errors 
from faults in PGCS SRS.    
26.04% 
               
Recall that Study 4 had two phases: a training session and a transfer session. The error 
abstraction accuracies achieved by Study 4 participants during training session were shown in 
Table 26. Next, during Study 4’s transfer session, participants used the HEAA tool to abstract 
errors from faults in the RIM SRS. The error abstraction accuracies achieved by participants 
during Study 4’s transfer session were also analyzed. It was found that participants were able to 
achieve a mean error abstraction accuracy of 38% when abstracting errors (suing HEAA) from 
faults in RIM SRS. After completion of Study 4, the HEAA tool was improved/refined based on 
participant feedback and the refined HEAA tool was used during Study 5. During Study 5, 
participants were given 16 faults in the RIM SRS and were asked to use the refined HEAA tool 
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to abstract errors from the given 16 faults. The mean error abstraction accuracy achieved by 
participants of Study 5 was found to be 45%. 
Table 27. Study 4 vs Study 5: Error Abstraction Accuracy Comparison 
Study Description Mean Error Abstraction Accuracy 
Study 4: 17 participants used the Human Error 
Abstract Assist tool to abstract human errors 
from faults in RIM SRS.    
38% 
Study 5: 15 participants used the Human Error 
Abstract Assist tool to abstract human errors 
from faults in RIM SRS.    
45% 
     
The analyses presented in Table 26 and 27 show that:  
• The Human Error Abstraction Assist tool has improved the error abstraction 
accuracy of inspectors when compared to Human Error Taxonomy. 
•  The improvements made to the HEAA tool (after Study 4) has helped in further 
improving the error abstraction accuracy of inspectors. A discussion on the 
improvements made to the HEAA tool was provided in Section 6.2.2. 
6.3.2.2. RQ2b: What insights into – the problems faced by the inspectors during the process of 
error abstraction using HEAA tool – can be used to improve the error abstraction process? 
Data gathered during Study 5 was analyzed to answer this research question. Study 5 was 
specifically designed to collect insights about the major issues inspectors face when using the 
HEAA tool to abstract errors from requirements faults. The HEAA tool used during Study 5 is 
provided in Appendix C. HEAA is a control flow style process, wherein control statements 
appear (inside decision nodes) in a top to bottom order. When using HEAA, inspectors have to 
make decisions at three (3) levels. At Level 1, the inspector has to decide the requirements 
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engineering activity in which the fault originated (i.e., the human error occurred). At Level 2, the 
inspector has to decide the high level human error type that was committed (slips/lapse/mistake). 
Based on decisions made for Levels 1 and 2, at Level 3, inspectors have to select an adequate 
human error class. For inspectors’ convenience, HEAA’s decision tree has been unpacked into a 
detailed, self-explanatory, and stepwise system that can be found in Appendix C. It is important 
to note here that, because HEAA is a control flow style process, if am inspector makes an 
incorrect decision in an initial decision level, then the rest of the flow is automatically rendered 
incorrect. 
During Study 5, participants were given 16 faults in the RIM SRS document and were 
asked to use the refined HEAA tool to abstract errors from the faults. The output of this task 
helped in comparing the error abstraction results of all participants for same set of faults. The 
idea was to investigate the following: At what level of the error abstraction process (i.e., when 
using HEAA) are participants making most of the misjudgments? 
Table 28 provides an overview of the error abstraction results reported by the 15 
participants. Each row in Table 28 provides error abstraction accuracy at different HEAA levels 
across all the participants for each fault. As an example, for Fault #2, 13 out of 15 participants 
were able to select the correct requirements engineering activity (where the fault originated). 
Therefore, we only evaluated the rest of the abstraction data of those 13 participants who 
selected the correct requirements engineering activity. The analysis showed that, 11 of those 13 
participants selected the right error type (slips/lapse/mistake). Furthermore, only 9 of the 
remaining 11 participants selected the correct human error class for Fault #2. Overall, 9 out of 15 
participants provided the expected error abstraction result for Fault #2 (i.e., only 60% of 
 76 
participants were able to accurately abstract the human error that caused Fault #2). Similar 
analysis was performed for all 16 faults.  
Table 28. Study 5: Progressive Error Abstraction Correctness at the Three Decision Levels of 
HEAA 
Fault # Number of 
participants who 
chose the correct 
RE activity (Level 
1 of HEAA) 
Number of 
participants who 
chose the correct 
Error Type (Level 
2 of HEAA) 
Number of 
participants who 
chose the correct 
Error Class (Level 
3 of HEAA) 
Overall Correctness: 
Number of participants 
who reported correct EA 
result for the fault (correct 
at all 3 levels) 
Fault 1 100% (15/15) 93.33% (14/15) 100% (14/14) 93.33% (14/15) 
Fault 2 86.67% (13/15) 84.62% (11/13) 81.82% (9/11) 60% (9/15) 
Fault 3 66.67% (10/15) 100% (10/10) 100% (10/10) 66.67% (10/15) 
Fault 4 53.33% (8/15) 75% (6/8) 83.33% (5/6) 33.33% (5/15) 
Fault 5 80% (12/15) 83.33% (10/12) 90% (9/10) 60% (9/15) 
Fault 6 66.67% (10/15) 80% (8/10) 37.5% (3/8) 20% (3/15) 
Fault 7 33.33% (5/15) 60% (3/5) 33.33% (1/3) 6.67% (1/15) 
Fault 8 66.67% (10/15) 80% (8/10) 87.5% (7/8) 46.67% (7/15) 
Fault 9 73.33% (11/15) 63.64% (7/11) 85.71% (6/7) 40% (6/15) 
Fault 10 53.33% (8/15) 87.5% (7/8) 57.14% (4/7) 26.67% (4/15) 
Fault 11 46.67% (7/15) 100% (7/7) 71.43% (5/7) 33.33% (5/15) 
Fault 12 86.67% (13/15) 100% (13/13) 76.92% (10/13) 66.67% (10/15) 
Fault 13 66.67% (10/15) 70% (7/10) 71.43% (5/7) 33.33% (5/15) 
Fault 14 46.67% (7/15) 85.71% (6/7) 83.33% (5/6) 33.33% (5/15) 
Fault 15 53.33% (8/15) 100% (8/8) 87.5% (7/8) 46.67% (7/15) 
Fault 16 100% (15/15) 93.33% (14/15) 64.29% (9/14) 60% (9/15) 
       
Figure 21 compares the error abstraction accuracies achieved by the participants at the 3 
levels of HEAA. It was found that participants frequently misjudged the requirements 
engineering activity in which the faults originated. Furthermore, this analysis showed that, if 
participants picked the right requirements engineering activity, they were able to pick the correct 
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Error Type (slips/lapse/mistake) and the correct Error Class in most cases.  Figure 21 shows that 
the participants had the most difficulty when picking the adequate requirements engineering 
activity wherein the human error occurred (and resulted in the insertion of the fault being 
analyzed). Overall, for all 16 faults, participants achieved a median error abstraction accuracy of 
67% at the requirements engineering activity level (compared to 85% at Error Type level and 
83% at Error Class level). HEAA is a decision flow process and selecting an appropriate 
requirements engineering activity is the first decision that the inspectors have to make. Selecting 
the incorrect requirements engineering activity essentially renders the rest of the error abstraction 
effort futile. 
 The analysis provided above (in Table 28 and Figure 21) revealed that in order to 
improve the error abstraction accuracy of inspectors, the training on requirements engineering 
needs to be improved.  
 
Figure 21. Study 5: Error Abstraction (EA) Accuracy at three HEAA Levels 
 78 
6.3.2.3. RQ2c: Is the error abstraction process (supported by the HEAA tool) more effective 
when employed by professional requirements engineers as compared to when it is employed by 
students? 
Data gathered during Study 6 (Live study at a conference) was analyzed to answer this 
research question. 
During Study 6, requirements engineering researchers and industry professionals were 
provided with 10 faults in the PGCS SRS and were asked to use HEAA to abstract errors from 
the given faults. Overall, the participants were able to achieve an error abstraction accuracy of 
59%. The main goal of Study 6 was to gather feedback about the HEAA tool from requirements 
engineering professionals. The requirements engineering professionals provided the following 
comments during a discussion session: 
• Participants stated that inspectors may have different understanding of 
requirements engineering activities (especially the order of analysis activity and 
specification activity) depending on the life-cycle employed in their software 
development projects. It was suggested that a glossary of requirements 
engineering activities should be provided (for future studies) to assist the 
inspectors during the error abstraction process. 
• Participants stated that during the error abstraction training, providing definition 
and examples of a "RE specific plan" (as opposed to everyday plan failures) 
would help inform error analyses. The current error abstraction training provides 
example about how to map everyday failures (like pouring orange juice in cereal 
instead of milk) to slips/lapses/mistakes. The participants suggested that training 
should provide examples of the different types of requirements engineering plans 
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(e.g., requirements elicitation plan, requirements analysis plan, and requirements 
management plan). This will help inspectors in better visualizing the 
situations/scenarios in which human errors occur during the various requirements 
engineering activities.        
6.3.2.4. RQ2d: Is the error abstraction process (supported by the HEAA tool) more effective 
when employed on self-developed requirements documents as compared to when employed on 
externally-developed requirements documents? 
Data gathered during Study 7 was analyzed in order to answer this research question. 
Study 7 was conducted across two phases: (1) Phase 1, in which participants abstracted 
errors from faults in an externally-developed PGCS SRS, and (2) Phase 2, in which the 
participants abstracted errors from the faults in the SRS documents that they had developed as 
part of their team. 
Table 29. Study 7: Error Abstraction Accuracy when Abstracting Errors from Faults in 
Externally Developed SRS vs Faults in Self-Developed SRS 
Team # Mean Error Abstraction Accuracy when 
Abstracting Errors from Faults in 
Externally-developed SRS (PGCS SRS) 
Mean Error Abstraction Accuracy when 
Abstracting Errors from Faults in Self-
developed SRS 
Team 1 35.36% 60.74% 
Team 2 34.57% 60.09% 
Team 3 32.14% 58.67% 
Team 4 38.73% 58.12% 
Team 5 39.52% 59.88% 
      
Table 29 presents a comparison between the error abstraction accuracies achieved by the 
participants during Phase 1 vs Phase 2. In order to perform the analysis shown in Table 29, first 
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the individual error abstraction accuracy for each participant was calculated. Then, the mean 
accuracy for each team was calculated. It was necessary to calculate the mean error abstraction 
accuracy for each team (and not all participants together) because, during Phase 2 participants 
abstracted errors from faults in different SRS documents. 
As can be seen in Table 29, participants in Study 7 achieved significantly higher error 
abstraction accuracies when using the HEAA tool to abstract errors from faults in their self-
developed SRS documents. 
6.3.3. RQ3: Can Error Abstraction Using the Human Error Abstraction Assist Tool 
Provide Significant Insights into the Type of Human Errors that are Committed Most 
Frequently During the Requirements Development Process? 
Data gathered during Study 7 was analyzed to answer this research questions. During 
Study 7, participants worked as part of a team to develop requirements documents (i.e., SRS 
documents) for different software systems. There were a total of 5 teams in Study 7 that 
developed 5 SRS documents. One of the objectives of Study 7 was to understand what kind 
insights are generated when software development teams use the HEAA tool to abstract errors 
from faults they committed when creating their requirements documents. It was important to 
evaluate this because, the HEAA tool was developed to help software developers understand the 
human errors that they frequently commit when creating their requirements. A software 
development team’s understanding of the most commonly occurring human errors during their 
requirements engineering process can help them in avoiding these human errors in future.  
It was anticipated that abstracting errors from faults in an SRS document can generate 
tailored insights about the most common human error related issues that a team faced when 
creating their SRS document. That is, each requirements creation effort is different in that it 
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involves different personnel who are trying to create requirements for different software systems, 
and hence the human errors committed by them are also different. Hence, it can be worthwhile to 
identify the type of human errors different requirements engineering teams are more prone to.       
First, I analyzed, for each team separately, the most frequently committed high level 
Error Types (Slip/Lapse/Mistake). Figure 22 shows the result of this analysis. As can be seen in 
Figure 22, the distribution of Slips, Lapses and Mistakes are different for different teams. This is 
because different teams worked under different environments and were trying to solve unique 
problems (the software systems they were creating the requirements for were different), and as a 
result the human errors they committed were also different. Figure 22 also shows that Slips were 
the leading cause of fault-injection when the teams were creating their requirements documents, 
followed by Mistakes. One clear trend that was seen across all five teams was that execution 
errors (Slips and Lapses together constitute execution errors) contributed to 60-80% of all the 
faults.  
This result is consistent with Cognitive Psychology research, where researchers have 
shown that most of the errors committed by human operators are execution errors. Human 
subject based studies in Cognitive Psychology have shown that 60-70% of all detected human 
errors are execution errors [39, 49]. 
 
 
Figure 22. Study 7: Percentage Contribution of Slips, Lapses, and Mistakes to Faults    
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Table 30. Study 7: Percentage Contribution of Human Error Classes to Faults 
 Slips Lapses --------------------------------------------------Mistakes-------------------------------------------------- 
Cler. LC LI Accd. Appln Env IM WA PU MB NH LA PS IR Synt 
Team1 23.7% 17% 13.6% 25.4% 11.9%  1.7% 5% 1.7%       
Team2 55.9% 14.7%  8.9% 5.9%   8.8%    5.9%    
Team3 23%  15.4% 36% 12.8%  5.1%       7.7%  
Team4 68.8%   8.3% 6.3% 8.3%  4.2%      2% 2% 
Team5 42.1% 13.2%    15.8% 18.4%       7.9%  
 
Next, in order to generate deeper insights about frequently committed human errors, an 
analysis was performed to examine the contribution of Human Error Taxonomy’s human Error 
Classes (see Figure 7) to the faults in each team’s SRS document. Table 30 provides the result of 
this analysis. Note that each row in Table 30 provides the distribution of human errors for one 
team. The sum total of each row in Table 30 is 100%. As can be seen in Table 30, teams 
committed different types of human errors when they were developing their requirements. For 
Team 1, the major cause of fault-injection was errors that happen due to Accidentally 
Overlooking Requirements (an error class under Lapse). Such errors happen when requirements 
engineers or end users or stakeholders forget to include a requirement or some information 
related to a requirement. Such overlooks are generally caused when end-users/stakeholders think 
that some things are obvious and fail to verbalize such information (a very common example is 
lack of requirements related of exception handling in SRS’s). For Team 2, most of the faults 
were traced back to Clerical Errors, an error class under Slip error types. Clerical errors happen 
due to carelessness during mechanical transcription of requirements from one medium to another 
(for example, carelessness when creating formal requirements specifications from elicitation-
notes). For Team 3, errors that happen due to Accidentally Overlooking Requirements were 
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again found to be the major cause of fault-injection in their SRS document. Most of the faults in 
both Team 4’s and Team 5’s SRS’s were mapped back to Clerical Errors. 
Furthermore, error abstraction using the HEAA tool can not only provide teams with 
insights about Error Types and Error Classes, but it can also provide insights about how prone 
their individual requirements engineering activities (i.e., elicitation, analysis, specification, 
management) are to different human error classes. To that end, the error proneness of 
requirements engineering activities to different human errors were analyzed (for each team 
separately). Table 31 provides the result of this analysis. It should be noted that for each Team’s 
table, the sum total of all cells in the table is 100%.  
For Team 1, most of the faults in their SRS were traced back to their elicitation and 
specification activities. Additionally, the major problem area for Team 1’s elicitation activity 
was Lapses (Loss of Information errors and Accidentally Overlooking Requirements). Team 1’s 
specification activity mainly suffered from Slips (Clerical errors and errors due to Lack of 
Consistency when writing specifications). As for Team 2, their most error-prone activity was the 
specification activity and it mainly suffered from Slips committed by the team members when 
writing the specifications. Most of the faults in Team 3’s SRS documents were mapped back to 
elicitation activity and Team 3’s elicitation activity mainly suffered from Lapse errors. As for 
Team 4, most of the faults in their SRS were traced back to specification and elicitation 
activities, with both activities suffering mainly from Clerical errors committed by team members.  
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Team 5’s most error-prone activity was specification activity and a majority of human 
errors committed by Team 5’s members were Clerical slips. 
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Overall, the analysis performed for RQ3 shows that, by abstracting human errors from 
their faults, software development teams can generate valuable insights about the major problem 
areas in their requirements engineering process. These insights can help development teams 
make future decisions about how to improve their requirements engineering process. 
6.4. Summary of Results Obtained from Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7 
Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7 validated the following: 
• The usefulness of the human error-based requirements inspection approach (i.e., 
the Error Abstraction and Inspection or EAI approach) when it is supported by the 
newly developed Human Error Abstraction Assist or HEAA tool. 
• The improvements in error abstraction accuracy provided by the HEAA tool 
during the error abstraction leg of the EAI inspection approach. 
Overall, during Studies 4 and 5, it was found that the EAI approach, when added to the 
traditional fault-checklist inspections, can provide significant improvements in the defect 
detection effectiveness of inspectors (see Figure 19 and 20). Study 5 also revealed the strategies 
used by successful inspectors that helped them find additional faults during the error-informed 
reinspection step of the EAI approach. Inspectors will be trained on these reinspection strategies 
(shown in Table 25) in future evaluations of the EAI approach. 
Additionally, results (in Tables 26 and 27) showed that the introduction of HEAA tool 
has helped increase the error abstraction accuracy of inspectors. An increased error abstraction 
accuracy means that inspectors are able to better understand the human error causes of 
requirements faults, which can help them find more faults related to the human errors during 
error-informed reinspection step of the EAI inspection approach.  
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Another major result obtained during Study 5 and Study 6 was that, when using the 
HEAA tool, inspectors faced difficulties when selecting the right requirements engineering 
activity wherein the fault originated. Requirements engineering professionals in Study 6 
suggested that improving the training around requirements engineering activities can help 
alleviate this problem. 
The four studies described in this chapter and the three studies described in Chapter 4 
focused mainly on the usefulness of human error information for detecting errors and faults in 
requirements documents. The next chapter describes a study that involved industry professionals 
and focused on creating prevention strategies that can help requirements engineering teams avoid 
committing the human errors.             
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7. ERROR AND FAULT PREVENTION 
Fault prevention can be described as the process of using the knowledge of likely 
problems to prevent those problems from happening in future. In software engineering research, 
the knowledge of likely problems is collected through historical fault/defect data, or expert 
opinion [50]–[52]. Fault prevention strategies that are based on historical fault data (i.e., a 
sample of faults) can provide specific measures/strategies to prevent those type of faults [50], 
[53]. On those lines, the human error information identified during the creation of the Human 
Error Taxonomy (Figure 7) presents an opportunity to create prevention strategies that can help 
in preventing the human errors from being committed by requirements engineers, and 
consequently the faults that are injected due to these human errors can be reduced as well.  
To that end, an industrial survey was conducted at a software development organization 
(which is based out of Minneapolis, MN). Industry requirements professionals were trained on 
human error types (slip, lapse, mistakes) and the various human error classes and were asked to 
indicate the approaches (i.e., strategies) that they use in order to eliminate or reduce the 
likelihood for human errors from occurring.  
Section 7.1 provide the research question and the study design, and Section 7.2 provide 
the result obtained from analyzing the survey data. 
7.1. Study 8: Research Questions and Design  
Table 32 provides the research question that was formulated during Study 8. 
Table 32. Study 8: Research Question  
# Research Question 
RQ1 What specific prevention strategies do industry practitioners employ for the 
human errors described in the Human Error Taxonomy?  
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The participants of Study 8 were 11 industry practitioners working in a software 
development organization based in Minneapolis, MN. The participants were first provided a 
video-based training on the human errors in the Human Error Taxonomy (HET). The training 
included: a module that helped participants understand the human errors types (slips, lapses, and 
mistakes), and a module that helped them understand the 15 human error classes in the Human 
Error Taxonomy. An additional module trained the participants on the Human Error Abstraction 
Assist or HEAA tool and how to use the tool to abstract human errors from requirements faults. 
This additional module was meant to provide participants with a deeper understanding about: 
how the human errors can lead to faults being injected in requirements documents. Post-training, 
participants were provided with a set of requirements faults, the complete information about each 
fault, a training supplement document containing description of each human error class, and an 
error form with their perception of the human error that caused fault-injection. Next, the 
participants were asked to answer the following survey item about each error: 
How would you reduce the future occurrence of the human error? (Note that participants 
provided subjective feedback for this survey item). 
7.2. Study 8: Data Analysis and Results 
This section provides the results of analyzing the data gathered during Study 8. This 
section is organized around the research question that was provided in Table 32. 
7.2.1. What Specific Prevention Strategies do Industry Practitioners Employ for the 
Human Errors Described in the Human Error Taxonomy? 
The participants provided subjective feedback for the following survey item: How would 
you reduce the future occurrence of the human error? In their feedback, participants described 
the prevention mechanisms that they use in order to eliminate the occurrence of specific human 
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errors. This feedback, containing prevention mechanisms, was first analyzed separately for each 
human error class. If the description of the prevention mechanism was found to be incomplete or 
incomprehensible, the mechanism was rejected. Next, from the remaining mechanisms, those 
prevention mechanisms that were similar were grouped together. As the reported prevention 
strategies were being analyzed, it was observed that four high-level groups emerged based on the 
problem that was being addressed by the reported strategies/mechanisms: 
• Prevention mechanisms for communication problems: Under this high-level 
category, participants described the prevention mechanisms for those human 
errors that result from cognitive under specification caused due to communication 
problems within the requirements engineering team and also the communication 
problems between the team and the end-users/stakeholders. Table 33 shows the 
prevention strategies for communication problems.   
• Prevention mechanisms through changes to resources: Under this high-level 
category, participants described the prevention mechanisms for those human 
errors that result from unavailability of expert knowledge about the system-being-
built. Table 34 shows the prevention mechanisms for this category.   
• Prevention mechanisms for management/administration problems: Under this 
high-level category (see Table 35), participants reported strategies that can help 
prevent human errors through some administrative changes.   
• Prevention mechanisms through changes to requirements engineering (RE) 
procedure: Under this high-level category (see Table 36), participants reported 
strategies that can help prevent human errors through changes to requirements 
engineering best practices. 
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Tables 33, 34, 35, and 36 provide prevention mechanisms that were obtained as a result 
of analyzing Study 8’s data.  
Table 33. Study 8: Prevention Mechanisms for Communication Problems 
Prevention Strategy 
 
Relevant Error 
Class in HET 
Relevant Requirements 
Engineering Activity 
Creating a communication plan that includes what type of 
communication should happen between the different team 
members, how should it happen (method of communication), and 
at what times (weekly, daily, or after completion of specific tasks, 
etc.). 
Clerical Errors 
(Slip) 
Specification, Analysis 
Requirements team should get a list of common terminology from 
end-users and make sure all members are familiar with them. It is 
almost impossible to expect different end-users will use the same 
words/names for an entity. 
Lack of 
Consistency in 
Requirements 
Specifications 
(Slip) 
Specification 
During requirements gathering, repeat back all the requirements 
that were heard and get confirmation that: 
(a) requirements were understood correctly 
(b) the end-users haven’t missed any special circumstances 
Accidentally 
Overlooking 
requirements 
(Lapse) 
Elicitation 
Creating a dictionary/glossary of terms used by clients. Notes 
gathered from different clients should be examined to check if 
different terms are being used for the same entity. If so, then the 
different terms should be consolidated into one name (in 
consultation with the clients). 
Wrong 
Assumptions 
(Mistake) 
Analysis 
The requirements gathering person should ask the right follow-up 
questions in order to force the client to be more concise and clear 
in their use of terminology and to avoid redundant terms. 
Wrong 
Assumptions 
(Mistake) 
Elicitation 
Knowledge transfer within the requirements engineering team 
should be encouraged. This can be done by asking requirements 
engineering team members to do presentations or talks about the 
parts of the system that they are currently working on. 
Additionally, end-users/stakeholders should be invited to such 
presentations in order to get feedback from them about: whether 
they think the requirements engineering team members’ 
knowledge about the system is correct.      
Poor/Low 
Understanding 
of Roles 
(Mistake) 
Elicitation, Analysis 
A glossary of important items/terms/entities related to the system-
under-development should be created and distributed to all 
members of the requirements engineering team. It should also be 
continually updated.   
Inadequate 
Requirements 
Process 
(Mistake) 
Management 
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Table 34. Study 8: Prevention Mechanisms through Changes to Resources 
Prevention Strategy 
 
Relevant 
Error Class 
in HET 
Relevant 
Requirements 
Engineering Activity 
If the complete knowledge of system is not present, then 
application errors can be avoided by consulting Subject 
matter Experts (SMEs). Organizations have SMEs for the 
various parts of the system (being built) and they can provide 
functional knowledge about the system. 
Application 
Errors 
(Mistake) 
Analysis 
Hiring an experienced requirements gathering person and 
training them on the dos and don’ts of requirements 
elicitation. 
Wrong 
Assumptions 
(Mistake) 
Elicitation 
Subject matter Experts or SMEs, who can provide functional 
knowledge about the system and various parts of the system, 
should be available. Having technical SMEs on hand is also 
useful and they can help in choosing the right solutions 
related to design and programming constraints. 
Problem-
solution Errors 
(Mistake) 
Analysis 
 
Table 35. Study 8: Prevention Mechanisms for Management/Administration Problems 
Prevention Strategy 
 
Relevant 
Error Class 
in HET 
Relevant 
Requirements 
Engineering 
Activity 
From a very early stage in requirements engineering, a 
process should be in place that ensures that ‘customer 
approvals’ can be readily obtained by requirements 
engineering team members. Not having too many 
layers between requirements engineering team 
members and end-users can help with this. 
Inadequate 
Requirement
s Process 
(Mistake) 
Management 
At the very outset of the requirements phase, the 
organization should establish a procedure for dealing 
with requirement-change. Procedures should be in 
place to ensure that team performs impact analysis for 
all proposed changes, and channels should be in place 
to get approvals from appropriate stakeholders. 
Inadequate 
Requirement
s Process 
(Mistake) 
Management 
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Table 36. Study 8: Prevention Mechanisms through Changes to RE Procedures 
Prevention Strategy 
 
Relevant Error 
Class in HET 
Relevant Requirements 
Engineering Activity 
Wherever applicable, when creating formal requirements specifications from 
elicited (and analyzed) requirements, the requirements author should make sure to 
get any formulas (mathematical expressions) validated from end-
users/stakeholders who have supplied the formulas. 
Clerical Errors 
(Slip) 
Specification 
Once the formal requirements specifications have been created, a workshop or JAD 
(Joint Application development) session should be conducted wherein end-users, 
programmers, testers, and system designers can review the document and discuss 
issues with the requirements engineering team. 
Lack of 
Consistency in 
Requirements 
Specifications (Slip) 
Specification 
Building dependency and traceability matrices early in the requirements 
engineering phase and keeping them updated can help avoid overlooking any 
requirements. Members of requirements engineering team should be encouraged to 
utilize these matrices when eliciting/analyzing/writing requirements. 
Accidentally 
Overlooking 
requirements 
(Lapse) 
Elicitation 
Both requirements engineering team and end-users should be encouraged to review 
the dependency matrix before requirements gathering sessions. 
Accidentally 
Overlooking 
requirements 
(Lapse) 
Elicitation 
If the new system is being built is going to replace a legacy system, then it is 
essential that the requirements team gains as much knowledge as possible about the 
existing legacy system. But if the system is one of a kind, then techniques such as 
creating use case scenarios and showing them to the end-users/stakeholders can 
help gather knowledge about the system. 
Application Errors 
(Mistake) 
Analysis, Elicitation 
When analyzing requirements, it is essential to think from a tester's perspective and 
validate every requirement being created. More specifically, requirements that 
describe formulas and mathematical expressions can easily be validated (by using 
techniques like boundary value analysis). 
Application Errors 
(Mistake) 
Analysis 
A central reference guide for all variables used during requirements creation should 
be created and updated periodically. The guide should also define the relationships 
(i.e., how a change in one variable effects another) between the different variables. 
Requirements team should ensure that they should refer to the guide whenever they 
are eliciting/analyzing/writing requirements that use variables. 
Information 
Management Errors 
(Mistake) 
Management, Analysis, 
Specification 
Creating data flow diagrams (DFD) using requirements specifications can reveal 
omissions. RE teams should be trained on DFD-construction and creating DFDs 
should be part of requirements engineering best practices. 
Information 
Management Errors 
(Mistake) 
Management 
Inconsistencies can be avoided by limiting the number of places in the requirements 
document where the same item/entity (e.g., an equipment) is discussed. If this is 
not possible, then the requirements engineering team needs to maintain a log of 
related requirements within the documents. 
Information 
Management Errors 
(Mistake) 
Management, Specification 
Assumptions are common issues, especially when a person thinks they know a lot 
about the system. Assumptions can be avoided by asking all members of 
requirements engineering team to create a central repository of any and all 
assumptions that they make while creating the requirements and making this 
repository visible to the entire team (so that team members can flag those 
assumptions that they think are incorrect). 
Wrong 
Assumptions 
(Mistake) 
Elicitation, Analysis 
If the team does not have the proper know-how about what are the correct 
resources/techniques for creating the solution of a given problem, then it is a good 
idea to create a proof-of-concept (POC) first.  The POC can reveal whether the 
solution that the team has come up with is the right one or not. 
Problem-solution 
Errors (Mistake)  
Analysis 
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Analyzing the data gathered during Study 8 has revealed a list of strategies that industrial 
practitioners use in order to avoid the occurrence of human errors described in the Human Error 
Taxonomy. It is anticipated that by applying these strategies, software development 
organizations can help the teams in avoiding the human errors and related faults, thereby 
increasing the quality of requirements created by the teams. 
The next chapter provides a discussion of the major implications of the results obtained 
during the research described in this dissertation.            
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8. A DISCUSSION ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS 
This chapter provides a discussion of the implications of the various study-findings (i.e., 
results) obtained during the research described in this dissertation. Here, I discuss the results of 
answering the various research questions and the implications of these results. This chapter is 
organized around the several research questions (discussed in Chapter 3, 4, 6 and 7) that were 
driving the research described in this dissertation. 
What types of requirements engineering human errors does the software engineering 
and psychology literature describe, and how can we organize the identified human errors 
identified into a taxonomy? 
The systematic literature review (described in Chapter 3) identified the human errors that 
are most frequently committed during the requirements engineering phase of the software 
development life-cycle. The outcome of the systematic literature review was a Human Error 
Taxonomy (Figure 7) containing requirements phase human errors. The development of Human 
Error Taxonomy required close collaboration with a human error expert from psychology. While 
a number of general frameworks for classifying human errors have been proposed by psychology 
researchers, the errors found in software engineering literature did not utilize these frameworks. 
Therefore, each error description needed to be carefully analyzed in order to determine whether 
it truly represented a human error. Research described in this dissertation has shown that a close 
interaction between software engineers and psychology researchers can help in providing a 
theoretically-sound human error framework for organizing requirements engineering human 
errors. Furthermore, the human error taxonomy developed in this research will help software 
development teams identify the most frequently committed human errors so that they can focus 
the requirements inspection process on identification and removal of the faults caused by those 
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human errors, and also create and implement strategies to prevent the human errors (e.g. 
checklists, and trainings).    
Does the human error-based inspection approach (i.e., the Error Abstraction and 
Inspection or EAI approach) improve the fault detection effectiveness of inspectors when 
compared to traditional requirements inspection approach? 
Multiple empirical studies described in this dissertation provided evidence that the Error 
Abstraction and Inspection approach can improve the fault detection effectiveness of inspectors 
when compared to traditional inspections techniques. It should be noted that the Error 
Abstraction and Inspection approach works as an addendum to the traditional fault-checklist 
inspection approach. Results from Study 4 (Figure 19) showed that, on an average, the Error 
Abstraction and Inspection approach (supported by Human Error Abstraction Assist tool) 
increased the fault detection effectiveness of inspectors by 225% as compared to conducting only 
fault-checklist inspection on the requirements document. That is, during Study 4, a significantly 
large number of faults were identified by the inspectors during error-informed reinspection that 
were left undetected during the first inspection (the first inspection was a fault-checklist based 
inspection). Overall, it can be concluded that knowledge of human errors can aid software 
development teams in finding additional faults related to those human errors. The central idea of 
the Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach is that once a development team becomes 
aware of the human errors that were committed during an SRS’s development process, it is likely 
that faults related to those human error are also present in the SRS. Furthermore, analyzing the 
data collected during Study 7 (see Table 25) helped in uncovering the strategies that successful 
inspectors use during the error-informed reinspection leg of the EAI inspection approach. It is 
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anticipated that by training inspectors on these reinspection strategies can further improve the 
fault detection effectiveness of the EAI approach.  
Does the Human Error Abstraction Assist tool provide a useful method for abstracting 
human errors from requirements faults? 
During the initial evaluations, the Error Abstraction and Inspection (EAI) approach was 
supported by the Human Error Taxonomy (HET). Then, the Human Error Abstraction Assist or 
HEAA tool was developed (with HET as its foundation) and it was found that the HEAA tool 
helped inspectors in understanding the error abstraction process better. We found that 
implementing the steps of a standard error abstraction process (in HEAA tool) helped the 
inspectors achieve better error abstraction performance. Furthermore, using feedback from 
participants, some improvements were made to the HEAA tool and the refined HEAA was able 
to further improve the error abstraction accuracy of inspectors. Results from Study 7, however, 
revealed that the participants face difficulties when applying HEAA tool to abstract errors from 
faults in externally-developed requirements documents (i.e., SRS documents). Therefore, there is 
a need for improving the error abstraction process and the HEAA tool when employing it on 
externally-developed SRS documents. Another major area wherein HEAA tool needs to be 
improved is helping inspectors select the correct requirements engineering activity where the 
fault (being analyzed for human error) originated. When using the HEAA tool, participants made 
most of the misjudgments when selecting the requirements engineering activity wherein the fault 
originated (i.e., the human error occurred and caused the injection of the fault being analyzed). 
Requirements engineering professional during a Live Conference study (Study 6) provided 
feedback that inspectors might have different understanding of requirements engineering 
activities (depending on the software development organization an inspector belongs to). This is 
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because organizations follow different requirements engineering processes and techniques. 
Therefore, requirements engineering professionals suggested that the error abstraction training 
should provide detailed descriptions of the various activities, so that all inspectors can develop a 
similar understanding of the activities before they start using the HEAA tool.    
What specific prevention strategies do industry practitioners employ for the human 
errors described in the Human Error Taxonomy? 
Study 8 compiled a list of the strategies or mechanisms that can be used by requirements 
engineering teams to reduce the incidence of human errors. A total of twenty-four (24) human 
error prevention strategies were identified during the survey. Of the 24 error prevention 
strategies, a majority of the strategies (17 of them) address Mistake error type in the Human 
Error Taxonomy. This showed that participants believed that Mistake errors represent a more 
deep-seated problem in the requirements engineering process. These problems are also called 
latent errors and require system-wide improvements/changes in order to reduce their occurrence. 
Additionally, strategies related to changes in requirements engineering procedures (Table 36) 
were the most frequently reported strategies. Almost half of all the identified strategies (i.e., 12 
out of 24) are related to human errors that can be prevented via changes in requirements 
engineering practices. Participants emphasized that requirements engineering team can prevent 
many errors and faults by creating and maintaining the following requirements engineering tools: 
dependency matrix, traceability matrix, Data Flow Diagrams, and a central data dictionary.                 
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9. CONCLUSION 
This section discusses the major contribution of the work described in this dissertation to 
Software Engineering research and practice. This section also enlists the publications that will be 
the output of this dissertation work. 
9.1. Contribution to Software Engineering Research and Practice 
   This research has illustrated that human error research has the potential to provide an 
effective solution to the software quality problem. Through a meticulous application of human 
error research to requirements engineering, this research has resulted in the development of a 
Human Error Taxonomy (HET) that is strongly grounded in human error theories.  
This research empirically validated the usefulness of the HET to support a formal 
requirements inspection technique (the Error Abstraction and Inspection - EAI) that can be used 
by researchers and practitioners when understanding requirement errors at their organizations. 
This will also motivate other researchers to employ human error research for developing similar 
human error based quality improvement approaches for other software lifecycle phases. 
Furthermore, this research highlighted the need for a more formal Human Error Abstraction 
Assist (HEAA) tool to help software engineers systematically investigate the human error causes 
of requirements faults. Interested researchers might develop similar tools to understand the 
human error causes of problems that occur during other phases of software development. The 
systematic literature review (SLR) procedure that identified requirements phase during this 
research can be used by other interested researchers as a blueprint to identify human errors that 
happen in other phases of software development lifecycle.             
The results from this work provide insight into the human error causes of defects and 
failures that occur during software development. These insights can be used by organizations and 
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developers to focus their review process on detection and removal of defects and to implement 
policies and interventions to prevent the most frequently occurring human errors. 
This research has also compiled a preliminary list of the mechanisms that can be used by 
organizations to prevent the incidence of human errors during software development process. 
Reducing the incidence of human errors will lead to a reduction in the number of faults/defects 
and failures that are caused by the human errors, thereby increasing the overall quality of the 
software being developed.    
9.2. Publications 
This section describes the publications resulted from the work done for this dissertation. 
The publication plan is described in terms of articles (conference papers and journal papers) that 
have been published, and the articles that have been submitted or are in progress. 
9.2.1. Refereed Conferences 
1. Anu, V., Walia, G., Hu, W., Carver, J., and Bradshaw, G. “Issues and 
Opportunities for Human Error-based Requirements Inspections: An Exploratory 
Study”, ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering 
and Measurement (ESEM 2017) [54].  
2. Anu, V., Walia, G., and Bradshaw, G. "Incorporating Human Error Education 
into Software Engineering Courses via Error-based Inspections", 48th ACM 
Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education (SIGCSE 2017) [55]. 
3. Anu, V., Walia, G., Hu, W., Carver, J., and Bradshaw, G. “Using a Cognitive 
Psychology Perspective on Errors to Improve Requirements Quality: An 
Empirical Investigation” Proceedings of 27th IEEE International Symposium on 
Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE 2016)[ [56]. 
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4. Anu, V., Walia, G., Hu, W., Carver, J., and Bradshaw, G. “Error Abstraction 
Accuracy and Fixation during Error-based Requirements Inspections” 
Proceedings of 27th IEEE International Symposium on Software Reliability 
Engineering Workshops (ISSREW 2016) [57] 
5. Hu, W., Carver, J., Anu, V., Walia, G., and Bradshaw, G. “Detection of 
Requirement Errors and Faults via a Human Error Taxonomy: A Feasibility 
Study” Proceedings of 10th ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Empirical 
Software Engineering and Measurement (ESEM 2016) [58] 
6. Anu, V., Walia, G., Hu, W., Carver, J., and Bradshaw, G. “Effectiveness of 
Human Error Taxonomy during Requirements Inspection: An Empirical 
Investigation” Proceedings of 28th International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Knowledge Engineering (SEKE 2016) [59] 
9.2.2. Refereed Journal Articles (Under Review and In progress)   
1. Anu, V., Hu, W., Carver, J., Walia, G., and Bradshaw, G. “Development of a 
Human Error Taxonomy for Software Requirements: A Systematic Literature 
Review” Accepted with some changes to Journal of Information and Software 
Technology (JI&ST), 2018. 
This article describes the systematic literature review process for developing the 
Human Error taxonomy (HET). This paper has been modified based on 
reviewers’ comments and re-submitted to JI&ST. 
2. Hu, W., Carver, J., Anu, V., Walia, G., and Bradshaw, G. “Using Human Error 
Information for Error Prevention” Accepted to be published in Empirical 
Software Engineering (EMSE), May 2018.  
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3. Anu, V., Walia, G., Hu, W., Carver, J., and Bradshaw, G. “Progressive 
Refinement of a Human Error Detection Tool for Improving the Investigation of 
Human Error Causes of Requirements Faults.” In progress to be submitted to 
Journal of Information and Software Technology (JI&ST), 2018. 
This paper will describe the series of three controlled empirical studies that 
resulted in the development and refinement of a human error detection tool 
called Human Error Abstraction Assist (HEAA). The error abstraction data 
obtained during the empirical studies will be analyzed for more insights. 
9.2.3. Workshops and Live Studies 
1. Anu, V., Walia, G., Bradshaw, G., Hu, W., and Carver, J. "Using Human Error 
Abstraction Method for Detecting and Classifying Requirements Errors: A Live 
Study" In 23rd International Working Conference on Requirements Engineering: 
Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ 2017) [48] 
2. Hu, W., Carver, J., Anu, V., Walia, G., and Bradshaw, G. "Understanding 
Human Errors in Software Requirements: An Online Survey", In 23rd 
International Working Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for 
Software Quality (REFSQ 2017) [60] 
3. First Workshop on Applications of Human Error to Improve Software 
Engineering. Held in the International Conference on Software Engineering 
(ICSE 2015) 
9.3.     Future Work 
An immediate task is to replicate the empirical studies (which were conducted in 
academic settings) with professional developers in industrial settings. This will help in 
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understanding if the results obtained from students are consistent with those obtained from 
industry practitioners. Another future task is to extend the Human Error Taxonomy (HET) by 
collecting and analyzing error data from professional developers. HET currently contains 
requirements phase human errors that were found in software engineering literature. In order to 
add more error classes to HET, I plan to conduct ethnographical studies, wherein a participant 
observer (a human error expert) will act as a fly on the wall and take notes as professional 
developers carry out the various requirements engineering activities.       
Another future goal is to improve the human error investigation tool (i.e., HEAA tool) by 
adding the human factors perspective of latent organizational errors. This will require reviewing 
the software engineering literature to identify the organizational weaknesses (like lack of time 
and resources allocated to requirements phase). These organizational weaknesses act as pre-
cursors to the human errors. This kind of comprehensive human error and human factor 
investigation can provide organizations an opportunity to perform fine-grained analysis of the 
people and process problems that exist within their requirements engineering practices.        
An area of future work is to develop and validate error taxonomies for the design and 
implementation phases of software development. Work has already begun on a research project 
that uses the systematic literature review process to identify the human errors that are committed 
during the architecture/design phase of the software development lifecycle. 
Another future goal is to create and evaluate educational materials and procedures that 
can be used by academic educators and project managers to impart knowledge about human 
errors that affect the software development process. This research will benefit students and 
practitioners by providing insights into the human cognition aspect of software development. A 
detailed understanding of the psychological and cognitive processes that lead to human errors 
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will provide software engineers with a fresh perspective on software quality assurance and equip 
them with new set of tools to prevent, detect, and fix software faults. 
Another future goal is to investigate other areas of Software Engineering and Information 
Sciences that can benefit from inclusion of Cognitive Psychology research on human errors and 
human factors. One research area that is of particular interest is: incident investigation of 
successful cybersecurity attacks from a human factors analysis perspective. This research will 
look at: what are the major cognitive and human factors that drive the erroneous behavior of the 
people involved in cybersecurity incidents.   
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APPENDIX B. HUMAN ERROR ABSTRACTION ASSIST (HEAA) – INITIAL 
VERSION 
1. Choose one of the following options to decide where the fault originated: 
(a) Did the fault occur  
• While the system was being analyzed? 
• While a large system was being divided into smaller parts? 
• While system functionalities (functional requirements) and system behavior (performance and 
other non-functional requirements) were being determined? 
(b) Did the fault occur during interviews or discussions with the stakeholders (end users, project sponsors, etc.)? This 
is where the user needs are gathered. 
(c) Did the fault occur when the system information/requirements were being documented to create a formal software 
requirements document? 
(d) Did the fault occur 
• During the management of the activities in a), b), or c) above?  
• As requirements evolved or changed (i.e., traceability, version control, etc.)  
RE activity associated to each option: 
Option (a) – Requirement Analysis. Option (b) – Requirement Elicitation. 
Option (c) – Requirement Specification. Option (d) – Requirement Management 
  
 
2. Please consider the task which was being performed when the fault was injected (i.e., when the human error 
occurred) and form a task/problem statement. For example, 
“Analyzing the number of available parking spaces in the parking garage to arrive at a generic formula for 
calculating the number of available parking spaces (a = k-r).” 
 
Note that you will be asked to provide this task/problem statement in the ‘Error-Report Form’ 
 
The boxes below provide the human errors that are relevant to various RE activities. Based on your answer to 
Question# 1, go to the appropriate box and pick the human error you think caused the fault.  
**Refer to the HET details document to get a detailed description of the human error and an example fault. 
Note that you will be asked to provide a brief description of why you picked a specific human error in the 
‘Error-Report Form’. 
 
 
  
Requirement Analysis 
▪ Application error:  requirement analyst's misunderstanding or lack of knowledge of a part of (or the whole) system 
or problem 
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement analysis tools available for use in the project 
▪ Wrong assumptions made by requirement analyst about user/stakeholder needs or opinions or any incorrect 
assumptions by RE analysts 
▪ Low understanding of each other’s roles:  RE analyst does not understand the roles of all end users, stakeholders 
and other RE analysts. 
▪ Mistaken belief of RE analysts that it is impossible to specify non-functional requirements in a verifiable form 
▪ Problem-Solution errors: Lack of knowledge of the requirement analysis process and general requirement 
engineering know-how 
 
 115 
  Requirement Elicitation 
▪ Clerical Error: Carelessness while recording user needs  
▪ Loss of information from stakeholders: Forgetting, discarding or failing to store information or documents 
provided by stakeholders.  
▪ Accidentally overlooking requirements 
▪ Application error: stakeholder's or requirement gathering person's misunderstanding of a part of (or the whole) 
system or problem   
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement gathering tools available for use in the project 
▪ Wrong assumptions made by requirement gathering person about user/stakeholder needs or opinions or any 
incorrect assumptions made by requirement gathering person. 
▪ Low understanding of each other’s roles: Requirement gathering person does not understand the roles of all end 
users and stakeholders. 
▪ Mistaken belief of requirement gathering person that it is impossible to specify non-functional requirements in a 
verifiable form 
▪ Not having a clear demarcation between client and users: Requirement gathering person's misunderstanding of 
the difference  between clients and users 
▪ Lack of awareness of sources of requirements 
 
Requirement Specification 
▪ Clerical Error: Carelessness while documenting specifications from elicited requirements. 
▪ Lack of consistency In Requirement Specifications: Lack of logical coherence in the requirement specification 
documentation, which makes it difficult to be interpreted correctly 
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement specification tools available for use in the 
project 
▪ Syntactic error: Misunderstanding of grammatical rules of natural language (English) or grammatical rules of a 
formal requirement specification language. 
 
Requirement Management 
▪ Inadequate Requirements Process: All steps required to ensure a robust requirement engineering process are not 
followed 
▪ Information Management error: lack of knowledge about standard procedures and practices defined by the 
organization 
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APPENDIX C. REFINED HUMAN ERROR ABSTRACTION ASSIST (HEAA) TOOL 
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  Step 2: 
Please consider the task, which was being performed, and form a task/scenario 
statement. In order to do this, try to visualize the scenario where you think the 
human error might have occurred. 
 
Based on the scenario, use the decision tree below to decide whether the human 
error was a slip, a lapse, or a mistake 
 
 
The boxes on the next two pages provide the human errors that are relevant to various RE 
activities. Based on your RE activity choice in Step 1 and human error type choice during 
Step 2 (slip, lapse, or mistake), go to the appropriate box and pick the human error you 
think caused the fault. 
You can refer to the HET details document to get a detailed description of the human error 
and an example fault. 
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Step 3: Pick the appropriate Human Error 
  
Requirement Analysis 
Slips: 
▪ Clerical Error: Carelessness while analyzing elicited requirements 
Mistakes: 
▪ Application error:  analyst's misunderstanding or lack of knowledge of a part of (or the whole) system or problem 
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement analysis tools available for use in the project 
▪ Wrong assumptions made by requirement analyst about user/stakeholder needs or opinions or any incorrect 
assumptions by RE analysts 
▪ Low understanding of each other’s roles:  RE analyst does not understand the roles of all end users, stakeholders 
and other RE analysts. 
▪ Mistaken belief of RE analysts that it is impossible to specify non-functional requirements in a verifiable form 
▪ Problem-Solution errors: Lack of knowledge of the requirement analysis process and general requirement 
engineering know-how 
Requirement Elicitation 
Slips: 
▪ Clerical Error: Carelessness while recording user needs  
Lapses: 
▪ Loss of information from stakeholders: Forgetting, discarding or failing to store information or documents provided 
by stakeholders.  
▪ Accidentally overlooking requirements: Overlooking a requirement or some information that is crucial to the 
requirement 
Mistakes: 
▪ Application error: stakeholder's or requirement gathering person's misunderstanding of a part of (or the whole) 
system or problem   
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement gathering tools available for use in the project 
▪ Wrong assumptions made by requirement gathering person about user/stakeholder needs or opinions or any 
incorrect assumptions made by requirement gathering person. 
▪ Low understanding of each other’s roles: Requirement gathering person does not understand the roles of all end 
users and stakeholders. 
▪ Mistaken belief of requirement gathering person that it is impossible to specify non-functional requirements in a 
verifiable form 
▪ Not having a clear demarcation between client and users: Requirement gathering person's misunderstanding of 
the difference between clients and users 
▪ Lack of awareness of sources of requirements 
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Requirement Specification 
Slips: 
▪ Clerical Error: Carelessness while documenting specifications from elicited requirements. 
▪ Lack of consistency In Requirement Specifications: Lack of logical coherence in the requirement specification 
documentation, which makes it difficult to be interpreted correctly 
Mistakes: 
▪ Environment error: misunderstanding or misuse of the requirement specification tools available for use in the 
project 
▪ Syntactic error: Misunderstanding of grammatical rules of natural language (English) or grammatical rules of a 
formal requirement specification language. 
Requirement Management 
Mistakes: 
▪ Inadequate Requirements Process: All steps required to ensure a robust requirement engineering process are not 
followed 
▪ Information Management error: lack of knowledge about standard procedures and practices defined by the 
organization 
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APPENDIX D. STUDY 7 - TEAMS AND SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
Team 
# 
# of 
members 
System Name and Description (Length of SRS Document) 
1 8 
Dissertation Calculator (DC): The DC application will allow graduate 
students to easily create a calendar with specific events and deadlines 
related to their dissertation progress. (7-page long SRS)   
2 6 
Science Olympiad Scoring System (SOSS): Function of SOSS is to 
store data for Science Olympiad competitions at NDSU. The goal of 
the system is to provide a central location for judges to view and edit 
scores for each event of the competition. (9-page long SRS) 
3 7 
Capstone Management System (CMS): Currently, Excel Spreadsheets 
and handwritten notes are used to administratively manage the 
computer science Capstone class and projects. The CMS project will 
develop of a set of tools for management of the Capstone Class. It will 
include the ability to authenticate users of Student and Admin type, 
project–bidding, profile view/edit, etc. (8-page long SRS) 
4 7 
Wonders of Weather (WoW): The WoW system will allow a course 
instructor to create a class in which the students can enter weather data 
on specified days. Instructor chooses which data is required on 
specific days and can enter the data on the required day. The system 
will also keep track of the students’ grades. (5-page long SRS) 
5 8 
Sugar Beet Research and Education Board (SBREB): Currently, The 
Sugar Beet Research and Education Board in North Dakota uses a 
physical paper medium for collecting and storing their grant 
proposals. SBREB will be an online interface for submitting, storing, 
and reviewing grant proposals and associated research. (6-page long 
SRS) 
 
 
